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David M. Uhlmann*
The Gulf oil spill was the worst environmental disaster in U.S. his-
tory, and will be the most significant criminal case ever prosecuted
under U.S. environmental laws. The Justice Department is likely to
prosecute BP Transocean, and Halliburton for criminal violations
of the Clean Water Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, which
will result in the largest fines ever imposed in the United States for
any form of corporate crime. The Justice Department also may de-
cide to pursue charges for manslaughter false statements, and
obstruction of justice. The prosecution will shape public percep-
tions about environmental crime, for reasons that are
understandable given the notoriety of the spill and the penalties at
stake. In some respects, the Gulf oil spill is similar to other envi-
ronmental crimes, most notably because it involves large
corporations that committed serious violations because they put
profits before environmental compliance and worker safety. Yet the
spill's most distinctive qualities make it an anomalous environ-
mental crime: the conduct was not as egregious, the harm was far
worse, and the penalties bear no relation to norms for environ-
mental crime.
The Justice Department should bring criminal charges based on the
Gulf oil spill, because a criminal prosecution will deter future spills
better than civil penalties alone and will express societal condem-
nation of the negligence that caused the spill in ways that civil
enforcement cannot. But criminal prosecution of the Gulf oil spill
may raise questions about the role of criminal enforcement under
the environmental laws, including whether ordinary negligence
should result in criminal liability as well as what the proper
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normative relationship should be between culpable conduct and
environmental harm. Nor can criminal prosecution, without more,
prevent future spills; for that to occur we must demand greater at-
tention to safety and more rigorously enforce our drilling laws.
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INTRODUCTION
On April 20, 2010, an explosion rocked the Deepwater Horizon oil rig,
killing eleven workers and triggering the worst environmental disaster in
U.S. history. For nearly three months, oil gushed uncontrollably into the
Gulf of Mexico. By the time the well was capped in July 2010, the govern-
ment estimates that 4.9 million barrels of oil-more than 200 million
gallons-had spewed from the well,' coating migratory birds, destroying
pristine marshes, sullying beaches, and inflicting incalculable damage to the
ecosystem of the Gulf.
Although much of the oil dispersed quickly in the warm waters of the
Gulf, reports vary widely about the long-term ecological effects of the spill.2
One scientific journal reported a vast twenty-two-mile plume of oil on the
1. JANE LUBCHENCO ET AL., NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. ET AL., DEP'T OF
COMMERCE ET AL., BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL BUDGET: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE OIL? 1
(2010) [hereinafter OIL BUDGET], available at http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2010/PDFs/
OilBudget-description_%2083final.pdf; see also Timothy J. Crone & Maya Tolstoy, Magnitude of
the 2010 Gulf of Mexico Oil Leak, 330 SCIENCE 634, 634 (2010) (estimating that the leak released
4.4 million barrels of oil).
2. See, e.g., Joel Achenbach & David Brown, In gulf oil spill's long reach, ecological dam-
age could last decades, WASH. POST, June 6, 2010, at A01; Campbell Robertson & John Collins
Rudolf, Cleanup and Questions Continue, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, at A16; David Biello, How
Long Will the Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Last?, SCI. AM. (May 14, 2010), http://www.
scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=how-long-will-oil-spiU-last.
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floor of the Gulf.3 Another report concluded that microbes had consumed
whatever oil had not been siphoned from the well, had not been burned or
skimmed at the surface, or had not chemically dispersed from the waters of
the Gulf. 4 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
("NOAA") established a blue-ribbon scientific panel in September 2010 to
assess the impact of the oil spill,5 a precursor to what is likely to be the larg-
est natural resource damage claim ever sought under the environmental
laws.' Whatever the fate of the visible oil, however, we may not know the
extent of the environmental harm for years, since never before has so much
oil spilled from an offshore well.
The economic hardship visited on coastal communities also may not be
known for some time. NOAA banned fishing in approximately 36 percent of
federal waters in the Gulf (nearly 87,000 square miles) at the height of the
spill.' Although the ban was lifted and fisheries began to reopen by late
summer 2010, the effect of the spill on spawning grounds and reproductive
capacities is uncertain.' For many consumers, doubts remain about the effect
of the oil on fish and shellfish, despite government claims that the fisheries
are safe.9 Similar uncertainty shrouds the future of tourism along the Gulf
coast: beaches had reopened by late summer, and oil was no longer wash-
ing up on the shores, but it is not known when vacationers will return-or
3. See Richard Camilli et al., Tracking Hydrocarbon Plume Transport and Biodegradation
at Deepwater Horizon, 330 SCIENCE 201, 201 (2010).
4. See OIL BUDGET, supra note 1, at 1-3; see also Achenbach & Brown, supra note 2 (dis-
cussing the process of microbial breakdown of spilled hydrocarbon compounds).
5. Editorial, Science and the Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2010, at A30.
6. The government obtained approximately $900 million in natural resource damages for
the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Cindy Chang, Exxon Valdez: a glimpse of the future for Louisiana?,
TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 8, 2010, http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/05/exxon-
valdez-a-glimpseofjthe.html. It has been suggested that the ecological damage to Prince William
Sound may have exceeded the harm to the Gulf because the Alaskan crude was thicker and because
the temperatures were much cooler. The Valdez spill also occurred closer to shore. See id. Nonethe-
less, the sheer volume of the Gulf oil spill (twenty times greater than the Valdez spill, see Laura
Moss, The 13 Largest Oil Spills in History, MOTHER NATURE NETWORK (Jul. 16, 2010, 12 PM),
http://www.mnn.comlearth-matters/wilderness-resources/stories/the-13-largest-oil-spills-in-history)
and the number of states suffering harm-along with the fact that one billion dollars in 1990 is a
much larger sum today-make a multi-billion-dollar natural-resource damage claim likely as a
result of the Gulf oil spill. Perhaps in recognition of these facts, BP agreed in April 2011 to make a
one billion dollar advanced payment for Gulf coast restoration efforts. John M. Broder, BP Agrees to
Pay $1 Billion for Start of Gulf Restoration, N.Y TIMEs, Apr. 22, 2011, at A13.
7. Cutler Cleveland, Deepwater Horizon oil spill, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE EARTH (Dec. 5,
2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.eoearth.org/article/Deepwater_Horizonoil-spill.
8. US Reopens Nearly 3000 More Square Miles of Gulf to Fishing, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5,
2010; NOAA Reopens More than 4,000 Square Miles of Closed Gulf Fishing Area, NAT'L OCEANIC
& ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories20l0/
20100827_reopen.html [hereinafter NOAA Reopens]; see also Joel K. Bourne, Jr., The Deep Di-
lemma, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Oct. 2010, at 40, 51-53 (reviewing, inter alia, the effects of the spill).
9. Tests by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") and NOAA have shown that the
level of oil-related chemicals in seafood samples are below the level of concern. NOAA Reopens,
supra note 8. Nevertheless, Louisiana has asked BP for $450 million to support testing and seafood
marketing over the next two decades. Shaila Dewan, Questions Linger as Shrimp Season Opens in
Gulf, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 17, 2010, at Al9.
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whether they will return in prespill numbers.'o Adding insult to injury, at
least in the eyes of Gulf coast residents who work on offshore drilling
platforms, the spill has raised questions about the efficacy of future drilling
on the Gulf, which are likely to persist even though the government has
lifted its moratorium on the issuance of new deepwater drilling permits."
New regulations have been imposed, and increased liability limits may fol-
low in the wake of the Gulf spill, 2 which could slow the pace of future
drilling and limit the number of companies involved-and, in the process,
shed drilling jobs.
Whatever the long-term ecological and economic impacts, the Gulf oil
spill has been traumatic for a region still recovering from Hurricane Katrina.
Once again, the region has experienced ecological devastation and economic
dislocation. The federal government once more was ill-prepared in its disas-
ter planning and emergency response. 14 In at least one significant respect,
however, the Gulf oil spill is different: giant corporations, not forces of na-
ture, visited this misery on the Gulf region. While there may have been a
human dimension to both tragedies, the heartache of the region and the
outrage of the nation are focused on BP and the other companies involved in
the spill, whose perceived willingness to put profits before safety wreaked
such havoc. Hundreds of tort cases have been filed in response to the spill,
10. See generally OXFORD ECON., POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE GULF OIL SPILL ON TOUR-
IsM (2010), available at http://www.ustravel.org/sites/default/files/page/2009/1l/GulfOilSpill
AnalysisOxfordEconomics_710.pdf.
11. Peter Baker & John M. Broder, White House Lifts Ban on Deepwater Drilling, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 13, 2010, at Al. On May 6, 2010, Department of the Interior Secretary Ken Salazar
imposed a moratorium on new offshore drilling pending an investigation into the spill, though exist-
ing projects were allowed to continue. NPR Staff & Wires, Interior Secretary Halts Offshore
Drilling Leases, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (May 6, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyld=126565762. A revised ban was issued in July 2010 after a federal court enjoined the original
moratorium. MSNBC.com Staff & News Serv. Reports, Revised deep drilling moratorium is un-
veiled, MSNBC.coM (July 12, 2010, 6:59 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/id/38204465/ns/disaster-in-
the-gulf.
12. See, e.g., Baker & Broder, supra note 11 ("The [Department of the Interior's Bureau of
Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement] estimates that compliance with the added
regulations will cost the deepwater industry $183 million a year, largely for changes in well design
and the requirement that operators maintain subsea robots to operate blowout preventers in case
primary control systems fail."); see also Erica Werner, WH wants increased industry liability in oil
spill, ASSoCIATED PRESS, May 12, 2010, available at 5/12/10 AP DataStream 20:40:15 (Westlaw)
("The White House asked Congress ... to raise limits on BP's liability .... approve new spending
... and increase taxes on oil companies for an emergency cleanup fund.").
13. Ben Casselman & Daniel Gilbert, Drilling Is Stalled Even After Ban Is Lifted, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 3, 2011, at At.
14. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Reports Fault Administration on Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7,
2010, at A20; Ayesha Rascoe, Oil spill response not up to date -panel co-chair, REUTERS, Sept. 27,
2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USN2725932420100927.
15. See, e.g., Spencer S. Hsu, Katrina compensation urged as judge faults Army Corps,
WASH. PosT, Nov. 20, 2009, at A03 (recounting a federal district court judge's acknowledgement of
the "'monumental negligence"' of the government in maintaining floodwater channels).
16. In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20,
2010, 731 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1353 & n.l (J.P.M.L. 2010) (consolidating seventy-seven civil actions
and noting that there are more than 200 related civil actions).
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and in December 2010, the Justice Department brought a civil suit against
BP and eight other companies alleging Clean Water Act violations and seek-
ing civil penalties, cleanup costs, and damages. 7
Yet civil lawsuits based on the Gulf oil spill are just the beginning: the
Justice Department will also bring criminal charges against BP, Transocean,
and, in all likelihood, Halliburton." The charges will include criminal
violations of the Clean Water Act" and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,20 two
of the environmental crimes charged in the Exxon Valdez case. 2' The charges
are also likely to include manslaughter in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1112 or
under a seldom-used law known as the Seaman's Manslaughter Statute22 to
address the worker deaths. The Clean Water Act violations and
manslaughter charges would require the government to show at least
negligence; a violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act is a strict liability
offense that was committed as soon as oil from the spill coated migratory
birds. The Justice Department also could bring charges under the Marine
23 24Mammal Protection Act, the Endangered Species Act,2 and the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act 5 to highlight the oil spill's effect on aquatic life
17. Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Eric Holder Announces
Civil Lawsuit Regarding Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/
iso/opa/ag/speeches/2010/ag-speech-101215.html.
18. See John Schwartz, With Criminal Charges, Costs to BP Could Soar, N.Y. TIMES, June
17, 2010, at A18; Marisa Taylor, Criminal charges likely from Gulf oil spill, legal experts say,
MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, May 12, 2010, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/05/12/94061/federal-
laws-point-to-criminal.html; Justice Department Probes Spill; Charges Expected, NAT'L PuB. RA-
DIO (June 9, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=1 2 75 8 6 49 7 .
19. Clean Water Act § 309(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (2006) (negligent discharges in
violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3)); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (knowing discharges in violation of 33
U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3)).
20. Migratory Bird Treaty Act § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2006) (prohibiting the unauthorized
taking or killing of migratory birds); 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) (providing misdemeanor penalties for any
violations of the provisions of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act).
21. Exxon Shipping Co. and Exxon Corp., No. 90-CR-00015 (D. Alaska 1991). In the Exxon
Valdez case, the United States also charged strict liability violations of the Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 407, 411, because the discharge occurred in navigable waters of the United States.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1115 (2006) (providing felony sanctions for any vessel owner or person
"through whose ... neglect . . . the life of any person is destroyed"). There may be questions raised
about whether federal manslaughter statutes apply when death occurs on foreign-flagged vessels
operating within the exclusive economic zone of the United States, which is not within the territorial
waters of the United States. Under 18 U.S.C. § 7(7), however, the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States extends to "[a]ny place outside the jurisdiction of any nation with
respect to an offense committed . . . against a national of the United States."
23. Marine Mammal Protection Act § 102(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1372(a) (2006) (prohibiting the
unauthorized taking of marine mammals in waters under the jurisdiction of the United States); 16
U.S.C. § 1375(b) (providing misdemeanor penalties for knowing violations of the Marine Mammal
Protection Act).
24. Endangered Species Act § 9(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (2006) (prohibiting the unauthor-
ized taking of endangered species); 16 U.S.C. § 1540(b) (providing misdemeanor penalties for
knowing violations of the Endangered Species Act).
25. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act § 24(c), 43 U.S.C. § 1350(c) (2006) (providing felony
penalties for knowing and willful violations of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and the terms
of any lease, license, or permit issued under the Act).
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and any violations of drilling regulations, although each of these acts require
proof that the defendants acted knowingly (and, in some cases, willfully). If
there is evidence that corporate officials lied to the government about
conditions at the well or about the amount of oil spewing into the Gulf, the
Justice Department could also charge false statements and obstruction of
justice.2
Once charging decisions are made, the Justice Department is likely to
negotiate plea agreements that will be entered prior to indictment or shortly
thereafter. BP faces a criminal penalty that will dwarf the $150 million fine
in the Exxon Valdez tragedy, which is currently the largest penalty ever im-
posed for environmental crime.2 With damage estimates from the Gulf oil
spill ranging from twenty billion dollars to fifty billion dollars, 28 BP could
receive a multi-billion-dollar criminal fine, which would be the largest fine
imposed in the United States for any corporate crime.29 Transocean and
Halliburton may incur criminal penalties in the hundreds of millions of dol-
lars, and possibly even one billion dollars or more.
For many, the Gulf oil spill will become the paradigmatic case of envi-
ronmental crime in the United States-and not just because it will produce
record criminal fines. Intense media focus brought the spill into living
rooms across America for nearly three months. The struggles of communi-
ties along the Gulf coast when so many Americans were reeling from a
recession made BP a target of public anger and resentment, which only in-
creased with reports about the billions of dollars that BP earns every year
from its drilling activities,o and when BP's then-Chief Executive Officer
Tony Hayward said "'I'd like my life back' "" in the weeks after the spill. In
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006) (false statements); id. §§ 1503(a), 1505, 1512(c), 1519 (obstruc-
tion of justice). The Criminal Division of the Justice Department, which in March 2011 assumed
leadership of the Gulf oil spill task force, is reportedly investigating possible securities violations as
well. David Hammer, BP officials queried in federal investigation into possibility of insider training,
TIMEs-PICAYUNE (Mar. 16, 2011, 10:30 PM), http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spilllindex.ssf/
2011/03/bp officials.queried in federa.html.
27. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
28. Compare OXFORD EcoN., supra note 10, at 2 (projecting regional costs at $22.7 billion),
with Victoria Bryan, BP to raise $50 billion for oil spill costs: report, REUTERS, June 20, 2010,
available at http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE65JI0G20100620 (suggesting BP's
anticipation of costs as high as fifty billion dollars).
29. Under the Alternative Fines Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (2006), the maximum criminal pen-
alty for the Clean Water Act violations will be twice the losses resulting from the oil spill. See infra
note 172. To date, the largest criminal fine-$1.3 billion (along with $1 billion in civil penalties)-
was paid by Pfizer for marketing fraud. Gardiner Harris, Pfizer Pays $2.3 Billion to Settle Inquiry
Over Marketing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2009, at B4.
30. See, e.g., Nicholas Graham, BPs Pmfits Far Outweigh The Cost Of Cleaning Up Gulf
Oil Spill, HUFFINGTON POST (May 27, 2010, 12:18 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/
27/bps-profits-far-outweigh_n_591992.html.
31. Jad Mouawad & Clifford Krauss, Another Torrent BP Works to Stem: Its C.E.O., N.Y.
TIMES, June 4, 2010, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/04/us/04image.html. To
some extent, Mr. Hayward's comment has been taken out of context: his statement came after a
lengthy expression of regret and remorse about the spill. Nonetheless, his remarks reinforced public
impressions of BP's troubled corporate culture.
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the court of public opinion, BP already stands convicted,32 and the eventual
criminal prosecution of the Gulf oil spill will frame public perceptions about
what constitutes environmental crime.
The Gulf oil spill is similar to other environmental crimes to the extent
that it involves corporations that did not place sufficient emphasis on envi-
ronmental protection and worker safety. In addition, investigators could
develop evidence of deliberate violations or misleading conduct, which is
typical in environmental criminal cases. Absent such evidence, however, the
Gulf oil spill will be more anomalous than paradigmatic environmental
crime. Most environmental crimes involve intentional acts of pollution, such
as midnight dumping or efforts to hide illegal pollution; the Gulf oil spill
does not. It is criminal only because the Clean Water Act contains negli-
gence provisions, which are unusual under the environmental laws and are
rarely charged. Likewise, most environmental crimes do not involve demon-
strable harm to the environment or economic impact. The Gulf oil spill will
be criminally prosecuted primarily because of the environmental and eco-
nomic harm that it caused to the Gulf and the communities along its shores.
The Gulf oil spill warrants criminal prosecution despite its anomalies.
There is substantial evidence that BP, Transocean, and Halliburton departed
from industry standards in the drilling of the Macondo well. We expect
companies engaged in deepwater drilling to demonstrate greater commit-
ment to environmental protection and safety, particularly when their risky
behavior can cause catastrophic harm. Criminal prosecution will deter future
spills more than civil penalties alone and will ensure restitution to victims of
the Gulf oil spill, which may be limited in civil cases because of the liability
cap set by the Oil Pollution Act. Moreover, criminal prosecution will ex-
press societal condemnation of the conduct that caused the Gulf oil spill in
ways that civil enforcement cannot, which is one of the purposes of the
criminal law. Conversely, if the Justice Department were to decline criminal
prosecution under the Clean Water Act and the Seaman's Manslaughter
Statute, the government would send the wrong message about the ecological
damage to the Gulf, the suffering of the communities along the Gulf coast,
and the value of the lives of the workers who died when the Deepwater
Horizon exploded.
Nonetheless, because of its anomalies, the Gulf oil spill may raise ques-
tions about the proper role of criminal enforcement under the environmental
laws. The use of negligence charges in such a high-profile case may lend
support to those who argue that the environmental laws do not contain ade-
quate distinctions between conduct that is criminal and violations that
should be addressed by civil penalties. The focus on harm may risk prosecu-
torial overreaching if we allow our after-the-fact outrage about the harm to
32. In June 2010, a Washington Post-ABC News poll showed that 64 percent of Americans
thought the federal government should pursue criminal charges against BP and the other companies
involved in the Gulf oil spill. Jon Cohen, Poll shows negative ratings for BP federal government,
WASH. PosT BEHIND THE NUMBERS (June 7, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/
behind-the-numbers/2010/06/poll shows-negative ratingsjfo.html.
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substitute for a sober assessment of how the prospective conduct was crimi-
nal. Criminal sanctions often are greater when harm occurs, but the
dominant view among criminal law theorists is that the focus of the criminal
law should be on the defendant's culpable conduct and state of mind, not the
fortuity of whether harm ensues.
This Article considers criminal prosecution of the Gulf oil spill in the
context of our still-emerging understanding of what constitutes environ-
mental crime and our understanding of the criminal law more generally. Part
I provides an overview of the events that led to the Gulf oil spill, the efforts
to contain the spill, and the regulatory failures that may have contributed to
the spill. Part II addresses the legal and factual bases for criminal prosecu-
tion of the Gulf oil spill, along with the discretionary factors that make
criminal prosecution likely. Part III asserts that the Gulf oil spill will be
viewed by many as the paradigmatic environmental crime and explains why
that perception is wrong. Part IV argues that criminal prosecution of the
Gulf oil spill is appropriate under a deterrence theory of criminal law and
because it expresses societal condemnation of the spill, but that the ways in
which the case is anomalous raise issues about the role of criminal enforce-
ment under the environmental laws. The Article concludes that criminal
prosecution, although warranted, is not a substitute for more vigilant regula-
tion of offshore drilling and more vigorous enforcement of offshore drilling
laws.
I. A "NIGHTMARE WELL": AN OVERVIEW OF THE WORST
ACCIDENTAL OFFSHORE OIL SPILL IN HISTORY
The Macondo well, located approximately seventy miles southeast of
Venice, Louisiana" and leased to BP Exploration and Production, Inc.,
Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, and MOEX Offshore (a subsidiary of
Mitsui Corporation),34 was troubled long before the blowout that resulted in
the largest accidental offshore oil spill in history.35 BP hired Transocean to
33. Response Efforts to the Gulf Coast Oil Spill: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Commerce,
Sci., & Transp., 11 th Cong. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Response Efforts Hearing] (statement of Admiral
Thad Allen, National Incident Commander), available at http://commerce.senate.gov (click "Hear-
ings" tab; then change "Browse by" boxes to "May" and "2010"; then click "Go").
34. BP owned 65% of the well; Anadarko owned 25%, and Mitsui owned 10%. See Lease
Owner Data for Lease G32306, BuREAu OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REG. & ENFORCEMENT, http://
www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/fastfacts/leaseowner/master.asp (check "Lease Number" box; then
type "G32306" in Lease Number text entry field; then click "Submit" button) (last visited Mar. 4,
2011); Yuji Okada & Shigeru Sato, Mitsui's MOEX Withholds $480 Million Costs From BP,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Aug. 3, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-08-03/mitsui-
s-moex-withholds-480-million-costs-from-bp.htm].
35. Previously, the largest accidental offshore oil spill was the Ixtoc I spill off the coast of
Mexico in 1979, which lasted nearly a year and which resulted in the release of 454,000 tons of
crude. Remy Melina, Top 10 worst oil spills, MSNBC.com (Apr. 29, 2010, 1:45:56 PM), http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/36852827/ns/us news-environment/. The largest offshore spill of any kind
occurred in 1991 during the first Gulf War, when Saddam Hussein ordered the intentional discharge
of nearly 1.5 million tons of oil from wells and pipelines as Iraqi forces retreated from Kuwait. See
id.
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drill the well in October 2009, but drilling was halted after just thirty-four
days because of Hurricane Ida." The original rig was damaged by the storm,
so Transocean brought in the Deepwater Horizon-the workhorse of the
Transocean fleet-to drill the well beginning in February 2010.
During the next two months, Deepwater Horizon experienced disrup-
tions that foreshadowed the events to come. In March, the rig's drill pipe
became stuck as it bored down, forcing Transocean to drill around the
blockage. The rig subsequently began to experience "'well-control'" prob-
lems.3 9 Drilling mud disappeared into cracks in the formation, and "violent
'kicks' of gas and oil" halted drilling for more than a week.40 By April 2010,
the well was weeks behind schedule, which was costing BP approximately
$500,000 per day.4 ' A week before the blast, an engineer called Macondo a
"nightmare well,"42 while others called it the "well from hell."43
In addition to the problems with the Macondo well, there were issues on
the Deepwater Horizon rig. Transocean commissioned a survey of rig work-
ers, many of whom stated they were concerned about their safety and feared
retaliation if they reported problems." An equipment assessment showed
that many key components of the rig, including the blowout preventer, had
not been fully inspected since 2000.45 BP conducted a maintenance audit in
September 2009, which indicated that 3,500 hours of necessary work had
not been performed on the rig;46 Minerals Management Service ("MMS")
and Coast Guard reports revealed that the Deepwater Horizon had experi-
enced a series of spills, fires, and even a collision, due to equipment
malfunction, faulty human operation, and bad weather, during the nine years
that the rig drilled for BP. 47
36. NAT'L COMM'N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP
WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 92 (2011) [hereinafter NA-
TIONAL COMMISSION REPORT], available at http://www.oilspilicommission.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/DEEPWATERReporttothePresidentFINAL.pdf.
37. Id.
38. Bourne, Jr., supra note 8, at 45.
39. Id.
40. David Barstow et al., Deepwater Horizon's Final Hours, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2010, at
Al.
41. Bourne, Jr., supra note 8, at 45; see also Barstow et al., supra note 40.
42. Bourne, Jr., supra note 8, at 45.
43. Barstow et al., supra note 40.
44. Ian Urbina, Workers on Doomed Rig Voiced Concern on Safety, N.Y. TIMES, July 22,
2010, at Al.
45. Guidelines require inspection every three to five years. Id.
46. Id.
47. Frank Jordans & Garance Burke, Deepwater Horizon rig had history of spills, fires be-
fore big Gulf of Mexico oil spill, NOLA.com, Apr. 30, 2010, http://www.nola.conunews/gulf-oil-
spill/index.ssf/2010/04/deepwater horizonrig..hadhist.html.
1421June 2011]
Michigan Law Review
Despite the challenges it presented, the Macondo well was a valuable
find: the reservoir contained at least fifty million barrels of oil.48 BP decided
to stop exploratory drilling and to prepare the well for future production.49 In
doing so, however, BP took a number of steps that may have increased the
risk of a blowout.o BP decided to use single-walled piping, the quickest
method for drilling a production well but one that offered fewer protective
barriers to prevent leakage." BP determined that it was not necessary to cir-
culate the drilling mud before installing a cement seal on the well, which
helps the cement cure properly.5 BP chose to install only six of the twenty-
one cement spacers recommended by Halliburton." BP also concluded that
it was unnecessary to conduct a cement bond test, which might have re-
vealed that explosive gas had seeped into pipes during the cementing
process. As it prepared to disconnect the rig from the well, BP decided to
remove the drilling mud and replace it with seawater--even though "re-
peated negative-pressure tests clearly showed a marked pressure buildup
inside the casing after the drilling mud was displaced with sea water."54
On April 20, 2010, rig workers were in the final stages of shutting down
the well for future production." Unfortunately, the workers did not know
that gas was escaping from the well. Workers may have been preoccupied
by a "sheen test" they were conducting on the drilling mud just before the
explosion -a distraction that could have been avoided had earlier negative-
pressure tests57 been interpreted properly. 58 Other warning signs were missed
as well.59 By the time, workers realized a blowout was occurring, it was too
late: "[G]as was already above the [blowout preventer], rocketing up the
riser, and expanding rapidly."6 When the gas reached the Deepwater
48. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 94.
49. Id.
50. See generally NAT'L ACADS., INTERIM REPORT ON CAUSES OF THE DEEPWATER HORIZON
OIL RIG BLOWOUT AND WAYS TO PREVENT SUCH EVENTS 5-9 (2010), available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/13047.html (click the "DOWNLOAD FREE PDF' button).
51. Tim Dickinson, The Spill, the Scandal and the President, ROLLING STONE, June 24,
2010, at 54, 60.
52. See Bourne, Jr., supra note 8, at 46.
53. Dickinson, supra note 51, at 60.
54. NAT'L ACADS., supra note 50, at 9. Although there are "no formal guidelines for the
interpretation and approval of the test results, it is clear that pressure buildup or flow out of a well
[was] an irrefutable sign that the cement did not establish a flow barrier." Id. at 10; see also Barstow
et al., supra note 40.
55. David Barstow et al., Between Blast and Spill, One Last, Flawed Hope, N.Y. TIMES, June
22, 2010, at Al.
56. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 112.
57. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
58. NAT'L ACADs., supra note 50, at 10.
59. Id. at 10-11 ("Had meaningful oversight of data on flow in and flow out been realized
during cementing operations, problems with the cementing operations might have been recognized
earlier. . . .").
60. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 114.
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Horizon, it was like "'a 550-ton freight train hitting the rig floor,' followed
by ... 'a jet engine's worth of gas . . . .' " At that point, an explosion and
fire were inevitable.62
As the blast rocked the Deepwater Horizon, the "blind shear ram" on the
blowout preventer should have closed off the gushing well. When a rig
worker pressed an emergency button immediately after the explosion, how-
ever, the blind shear ram failed to fully deploy.64 Two backup systems
designed to activate the blowout preventer-known as the "deadman" sys-
65tem and the "autoshear"-also failed in subsequent days. Compounding
matters, the blowout preventer lacked a remote-controlled shutoff fail-safe
switch-required by law in Norway and Brazil as final protection against
underwater spills.66 An expert report commissioned by the government con-
cluded that the blowout preventer failed because the riser pipe was not
centered properly and buckled when the blowout occurred, which made it
impossible for the blind shearing ram to deploy properly. Previous reports,
indicated, however, "that the blowout preventer may have been crippled by
,,61poor maintenance.
After the Deepwater Horizon exploded, firefighters rushed to extinguish
flames from the approximately 700,000 gallons of diesel fuel on board the
rig. Within hours, 115 of the 126 rig workers were rescued, but the remain-
ing 11 workers perished.69 Rig workers testified that "alarms and safety
systems on the rig failed to operate as intended, potentially affecting the
time available for personnel to evacuate."'5 After more than two days ablaze,
61. Id. (quoting testimony of Transocean official Bill Ambrose).
62. Id.
63. Barstow et al., supra note 55. But see NAT'L ACADS., supra note 50, at 12-13 (noting that
further investigation into "the design, test, and maintenance of' the blowout preventer system is
necessary and underway).
64. Barstow et al., supra note 55.
65. Id.; see also NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 115 (describing failure of
the deadman system).
66. Cleveland, supra note 7. "Federal regulators had specifically exempted the Deepwater
Horizon from having such a remote shutoff switch partially on the grounds of the costliness of the
device," which was valued at roughly $500,000, or "less than one percent of the Deepwater Horizon
capital cost." Id.
67. Det Norske Veritas, Final Report for the U.S. Dep't of the Interior: Forensic Examination
of Deepwater Horizon Blowout Preventer, 4-5, 173-76, Mar. 20, 2011, available at. http://
www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/extemal/content/document/3043/1047291/1/DNV%2Report% 2 0
EP030842%20for%20BOEMRE%2OVolume%201.pdf.
68. Barstow et al., supra note 40 ("Investigators have found a host of problems-dead batter-
ies, bad solenoid valves, leaking hydraulic lines-that were overlooked or ignored. Transocean had
also never performed an expensive 90-day maintenance inspection that the manufacturer said should
be done every three to five years.").
69. Response Efforts Hearing, supra note 33.
70. NAT'L ACADS., supra note 50, at 13; see also Barstow et al., supra note 40 ("For nine
long minutes, as the drilling crew battled the blowout and gas alarms eventually sounded on the
bridge, no warning was given to the rest of the crew. For many, the first hint of crisis came in the
form of a blast wave.").
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the rig sank into the nearly mile-deep water." On April 23, remotely oper-
ated vehicles located the rig on the seafloor.7 ' The next day, BP identified
73
the first two leaks in the riser pipe and alerted the federal government.
Within a week, government officials reported that the well was spewing
over 5,000 barrels, or more than 200,000 gallons, of oil per day.74 BP tried a
number of different measures to control the well, including a procedure
called "top kill," which involved injecting mud in the well, 7 and a procedure
referred to as "top cap," which involved cutting the riser pipes, removing the
malfunctioning blowout preventer, and placing a large cap over the well
head." None of these efforts succeeded, however, and the removal of the
blowout preventer increased the flow rates from the well to between 35,000
and 60,000 barrels per day.7
As efforts to seal the well foundered, BP attempted to collect or disperse
the oil before it reached the Gulf coast. By May 13, 2010, more than five
million gallons of oily water had been recovered using mechanical surface-
cleaning methods.78 BP applied nearly half a million gallons of dispersants
to break up the oil slick and used controlled bums to eliminate surface oil. 79
Meanwhile, government officials, working alongside BP, placed more than a
million feet of boom in shallow waters of the Gulf to protect sensitive
marshes and wetlands.o
The oil first touched land in Louisiana, and tar balls and oil mousse
reached the coasts of Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida in June." Beaches
were stained, marshy wetlands were infiltrated, and waterfowl became cov-
71. Cleveland, supra note 7.
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. Briefing Memo, Committee on Energy and Commerce, Hearing on Inquiry into the
Deepwater Horizon Gulf Coast Oil Spill, 1 (May 10, 2010), available at http://
democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/Press 111/20100510/Briefing.Memo.oi.05.10.2010.pdf. When
the spill began, BP officials had estimated that only 1,000 barrels of oil per day were leaking from
the Macondo well. Id.
75. Leslie Kaufman & Clifford Krauss, BP Says Its Latest Effort To Stop Gulf Leak Failed,
N.Y TIMES, May 30, 2010, at Al.
76. CBS/Associated Press, BP Admits "Top Kill" Fails, Will Try Cap Next, CBS NEWS, May
30, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/05/29/business/main6530758shtml.
77. Joel Achenbach & David Fahrenthold, Oil-spill flow rate estimate surges to 35,000 to
60,000 barrels a day, WASH. PosT (June 16, 2010, 9:30 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/06/15/AR2010061504267_pf.html. The National Commission on the BP
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling reported in October 2010 that the government
repeatedly underestimated how much oil was flowing into the Gulf of Mexico. Broder, supra note
14.
78. Response Efforts Hearing, supra note 33, at 3.
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill (2010), N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/
timestopics/subjects/o/oil-spills/gulf of mexico_2010/index.html (last updated Mar. 2011).
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ered in oil." The spill produced an oil slick in the Gulf extending nearly
29,000 square miles-about the size of South Carolina." As the oil spread,
scientists expressed concern that as many as thirty-two National Wildlife
Refuges could be affectedM and that the oil could enter Gulf "feedback"
loops that would carry the oil into the Florida Keys and to the East Coast of
the United States.
The spill finally ceased in mid-July when BP installed a much tighter
cap on the well and then slowly closed a series of valves.86 The well was
pronounced "dead" on September 19, 2010 after the successful drilling of a
87
relief well and the installation of a final, permanent cement plugging. The
federal government estimates that nearly five million barrels of oil escaped,
although approximately 800,000 barrels was siphoned from the well.8 Sci-
entists remain uncertain about how the remaining oil will affect aquatic
life.,
The precise cause of the blowout and subsequent explosion on the
Deepwater Horizon may never be known.90 Transocean Chief Executive Of-
ficer Steven Newman pointed to "a sudden, catastrophic failure of the
cement, the casing or both."9' BP and congressional investigators have sug-
gested that the cement seal failed to prevent gas from rising up in the well.
The presidential commission on the Gulf oil spill has determined that the
82. E.g., id.; David Muir et al., BPs Top Cap is Working, But Oil Spill is Still Spreading,
ABC NEWS, June 7, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/WN/Media/bp-top-cap-success-shore-cleanup-
proves-difficult/story?id=10849580.
83. Cleveland, supra note 7.
84. Id.
85. MSNBC.com News Servs., Oil fallout: Feds expand Gulf fishing ban, MSNBC.com
(May 18, 2010, 3:29:11 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/372129 11/.
86. See Jonathan Corum et al., Methods That Have Been Tried to Stop the Leaking Oil, N.Y.
TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/05/25/us/20100525-topkill-diagram.htm (last
updated Aug. 17, 2010).
87. Harry R. Weber, Blown-out BP well finally killed at bottom of Gulf, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Sept. 19, 2010, available at 9/19/10 AP DataStream 18:30:50 (Westlaw).
88. Crone & Tolstoy, supra note 1, at 634. An August 4 report estimated that one quarter of
the oil was burned, skimmed, or siphoned from the well, that another quarter naturally evaporated or
dissolved, and that a third quarter dispersed in the Gulf. Cleveland, supra note 7. The remaining
quarter, according to the report, is either on or "below the surface as light sheen and weathered tar
balls, has washed ashore or been collected from the shore, or is buried in sand and sediments."
LUBCHENCO ET AL., supra note 1, at 1.
89. See Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill (2010), supra note 81. Two government reports have found
low concentrations of toxic compounds deep in the ocean, but questions remain about issues such as
an apparent decline in oxygen levels in the water. Id.
90. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 115.
91. Justin Gillis & John M. Broder, Nitrogen-Cement Mix Is Focus of Gulf Inquiry, N.Y.
TIMES, May 11, 2010, at Al3.
92. Henry Fountain & Tom Zeller Jr., Panel Suggests Signs of Trouble Before Rig Blast, N.Y.
TIMES, May 26, 2010, at Al; see also INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM, BP, Deepwater Horizon
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT 49-180 (2010), available at http://www.bp.com/liveassets/
bp-jntemet/globalbp/globalbpukenglishincident response/STAGING/local-assets/downloadspdfs/
Deepwater Horizon_AccidentInvestigationReport.pdf (drawing comparable conclusions).
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cement used by Halliburton was unstable, which "may have contributed to
the blowout."3 Indeed, there is evidence that Halliburton's tests revealed that
the cement was unstable.94 Halliburton insists that it shared the results of its
tests with BP, however, and that BP, which failed to conduct additional test-
ing, is responsible for any problems with the cement. 5
What appears certain, however, is that BP, Transocean, and Halliburton
had inadequate management controls to prevent the tragedy that occurred on
the Deepwater Horizon. An interim report by the National Academy of Sci-
ences concluded that the problems on the Deepwater Horizon reflected an
inferior system for managing the "exceedingly complex" operations of off-
shore engineering and drilling. The report indicated that management
decisions vacillated between individuals and combinations of various com-
panies, while personnel changes occurred just prior to sensitive procedures.97
These problems, combined with a lack of oversight from shore-based per-
sonnel, "suggest[] a lack of onboard expertise and of clearly defined
responsibilities and the associated limitations of authority."98
The presidential commission on the Gulf oil spill reached similar con-
clusions to the National Academy of Sciences. "The most significant failure
at Macondo-and the clear root cause of the blowout-was a failure of in-
dustry management."99 The presidential commission cited BP's poor risk
assessment; Halliburton and BP's failure to ensure that cement was ade-
quately tested; communication problems among BP, Transocean, and
Halliburton; Transocean's failure to communicate to its crew lessons from
"an eerily similar near-miss" on one of its North Sea rigs; and a collective
failure to consider the risks associated with "time- and money-saving deci-
sions."' "
The Gulf oil spill exposed significant regulatory shortcomings within
MMS, the Interior Department agency responsible for overseeing drilling
93. See Letter to the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Off-
shore Drilling, Oct. 28, 2010, available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/science/
spilldoc.PDF; BP knew cement was poor quality before its use in well Testing showed flaws weeks
before the gulf explosion that killed 11, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2010, at 1.
94. Id.
95. See Press Release, Halliburton, Halliburton Comments on National Commission Cement
Testing (Oct. 28, 2010), -available at http://www.halliburton.com/public/news/pubsdata/press.
release/2010/corpnws_102810.html.
96. See NAT'L ACADs., supra note 50, at 14-16.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 14. Additionally, testimony has indicated that "standards for education, training,
and professional certification of private-sector decision-making personnel involved in drilling opera-
tions are relatively minimal compared with other safety-critical industries." Id. at 15.
99. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 122.
100. Id. at 122-26. An April 2011 Coast Guard report also faulted Transocean's management
systems and safety culture. John M. Broder, Companies, Crews and Regulators Share Blame in
Coast Guard Report on Oil Spill, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 23, 2011, at A9.
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safety."o MMS regulations, which involve only limited review of drilling
activity, are heavily based on data provided by the oil companies.102 MMS
did not impose requirements for conducting either negative-pressure tests or
cement testing, the inadequacy of which contributed to the Macondo blow-
out.'os Moreover, MMS was understaffed,'" and inspectors received
primarily on-the-job training that did not keep pace with technological ad-
vancements.0o MMS emphasized compliance counseling over enforcement,
and its civil penalty regulations were not commensurate with the seriousness
of the violations and threats to human health and the environment.06
MMS oversight of the exploration of the Macondo well was similarly de-
ficient. MMS did not conduct a full review of the potential environmental
impact of issuing a permit for the Macondo well, because it had granted a
"categorical exclusion" from the National Environmental Policy Act for indi-
vidual exploration plans.'7 MMS accepted an exploration and environmental
impact plan from BP that failed to consider a total blowout and lacked any
site-specific plan to respond to a spill, but referred instead to the protection
of species that do not live in the Gulf, including walruses.os Nor was MMS
101. According to Interior Department investigations, MMS managers received bonuses for
expediting risky offshore oil leases. Auditors were instructed not to investigate questionable deals.
The oil industry gave agency safety inspectors gifts and allegedly even drafted inspection reports for
the MMS to accept as their own. Dickinson, supra note 51, at 56.
102. See The Deepwater Horizon Incident: Are the Minerals Management Service Regulations
Doing the Job?: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Mineral Res. of the H.
Comm. on Natural Res., 111th Cong. 14-15 (2010) [hereinafter MMS Hearing] (statement of Mary
L. Kendall, former Acting Inspector General for the Department of the Interior); see also NAT'L
ACADS., supra note 50, at 18 ("It is not apparent to the committee that MMS had sufficient in-house
expertise and technical capabilities to independently evaluate the adequacy of the technological
standards and practices that industry developed for deepwater drilling.").
103. See NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 126. Another factor in the disaster
could have been federal regulation of well cementing, which fails to specify the type of cement
required. Mitch Weiss & Jeff Donn, AP Impact: Bad cement jobs plague offshore rigs, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, May 24, 2010, available at 5/24/10 AP Datastream 04:40:34 (Westlaw). Companies are
simply "urged" to follow American Petroleum Institute guidelines. In contrast, more specific stan-
dards exist on cement work for roads, bridges, and buildings. The MMS identified "cementing as a
factor in 18 of 39 well blowouts at Gulf rigs from 1992 to 2006." Id.
104. MMS employed approximately 60 inspectors for the Gulf's 4,000 facilities, compared
with 10 inspectors for 23 facilities in the Pacific. MMS Hearing, supra note 102, at 14 (statement of
Mary L. Kendall, former Acting Inspector General for the Department of the Interior).
105. See MMS Hearing, supra note 102, at 14 (statement of Mary L. Kendall, former Acting
Inspector General for the Department of the Interior); see also NAT'L ACADS., supra note 50, at 16;
NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 126.
106. MMS Hearing, supra note 102, at 14-15 (statement of Mary L. Kendall, former Acting
Inspector General for the Department of the Interior).
107. Cleveland, supra note 7; Dickinson, supra note 51. In a 2007 Environmental Impact
Statement regarding drilling leases for 2007-2012 for the region encompassing the Macondo well,
the MMS stated, "Offshore oil spills resulting from a proposed action are not expected to damage
significantly any wetlands along the Gulf Coast . .. Overall, impacts to wetland habitats from an oil
spill associated with activities related to a proposed action would be expected to be low and tempo-
rary." Cleveland, supra note 7 (alteration in original).
108. Bourne, Jr., supra note 8, at 50; Dickinson, supra note 51, at 58. Moreover, among its
equipment providers for spill response, BP listed the website of a Japanese home-shopping network.
Dickinson, supra note 51, at 59.
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more vigilant when it reviewed requests from BP during the drilling process.
MMS granted BP an exception from its regulations regarding the placement
of cement plugs for temporary abandonment in less than ninety minutes.
Tragically, MMS did not, according to the presidential commission, "assess
the full set of risks presented by the temporary abandonment procedure.""o
In response to the regulatory and oversight failures at MMS, Interior
Secretary Ken Salazar announced in June 2010 that MMS would be reor-
ganized as the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and
Enforcement and that separate divisions within the new bureau would be
responsible for permitting, royalty collection, and enforcement."' A signifi-
cant unanswered question is whether the complicity of MMS in the Gulf oil
spill will hinder the government's enforcement actions."12
11. THE LEGAL AND FACTUAL BASES FOR CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
OF THE GULF OIL SPILL
A catastrophic oil spill that brought death, ecological devastation, and
suffering to communities along the Gulf was bound to result in a criminal
investigation. In most cases where an environmental incident causes signifi-
cant harm to public health or the environment, the Justice Department
considers whether criminal enforcement is appropriate."' As a result, while
the Coast Guard, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), NOAA,
and MMS led the government's emergency response efforts, federal prose-
cutors were working behind the scenes within days of the spill to determine
whether BP and the other companies involved should be charged with envi-
-114
ronmental cnmes.
On June 1, 2010, President Obama confirmed the existence of a criminal
investigation of the Gulf oil spill and pledged that "[fi]f our laws were bro-
109. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 127.
110. Id.
111. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Salazar Swears-In Michael R. Bromwich to
Lead Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (June 21, 2010),
available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Swears-In-Michael-R-Bromwich-
to-Lead-Bureau-of-Ocean-Energy-Management-Regulation-and-Enforcement-Secretarial-Order-
Begins-Reorganization-of-Former-MMS.cfm; Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation
and Enforcement: MMS Gets A Name Change, HUFFINGTON POST (June 29, 2010, 5:37 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/29/bureau-of-ocean-energy-ma-n_629916.html.
112. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
113. David M. Uhlmann, Environmental Crime Comes of Age: The Evolution of Criminal
Enforcement in the Environmental Regulatory Scheme, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 1223, 1246 (2009). In
this context, "significant harm" includes public health effects (serious injuries or deaths) and envi-
ronmental harm (ecological impacts such as loss of wildlife or fish kills). Significant harm also
could include evacuations or cleanups involving substantial expenditures.
114. See David M. Uhlmann, Crimes on the Gulf, LAW QUADRANGLE, Fall 2010, at 31 [here-
inafter Uhlmann, Crimes on the GulfJ; David M. Uhlmann, Op-Ed., Prosecuting Crimes Against the
Earth, N.Y. TIMEs, June 4, 2010, at A27 [hereinafter Uhlmann, Prosecuting Crimes Against the
Earth].
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ken . . . we will bring those responsible to justice . ".. Some of the presi-
dent's political opponents questioned whether there was any need to
investigate. Texas Governor Rick Perry described the explosion as "an act of
God."' 6 Tea Party activist and then-U.S. Senate candidate Rand Paul opined
that we should avoid the blame game in the Gulf because "accidents hap-
pen.""' After BP agreed to establish a twenty-billion-dollar escrow fund for
spill victims-which may become a restitution fund when criminal prosecu-
tion occurs-U.S. Representative Joe Barton apologized to BP for the
"shakedown" at the hands of the president."
Politics aside, it is hard to dispute the proposition that the government
has an obligation to investigate the circumstances of an oil spill that took
such a terrible toll on the environment and coastal residents, not to mention
on the families of the workers who lost their lives on the Deepwater Hori-
zon. The government needed to conduct an independent inquiry into the
causes of the spill both to hold accountable those responsible for the spill
and to prevent similar tragedies in the future. There is some risk that a
criminal investigation will discourage cooperation by corporate employees,
who may assert their Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination, as
occurred during Coast Guard and MMS hearings regarding the Gulf oil
spill.' As a practical matter, however, it is best to address potential criminal
charges when the evidence is fresh, both because witness recollections are
more accurate at that point and because a prompt investigation preserves
evidence in the event criminal prosecution occurs.
The precedent for criminal prosecution in major oil spill cases was set
during the administration of President George H.W. Bush when the Justice
Department prosecuted Exxon Corporation and Exxon Shipping Company
for the spill that marred Prince William Sound in 1989.120 Several years later,
115. See Brian Montopoli, Obama Vows "Justice" For Oil Spill Crimes, Political Hotsheet,
CBS NEWS (June 1, 2010, 12:26 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544-162-20006435-
503544.html.
116. Aman Batheja & Maria Recio, Perry backs offshore drilling, says spill may be act of
God, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, May 4, 2010, http://www.star-telegram.com/2010/05/03/
v-print/2160779/perry-backs-offshore-drilling.html.
117. Kate Phillips, After Explaining a Provocative Remark, Paul Makes Another, N.Y. TIMES,
May 22, 2010, at A10.
118. Stephanie Condon, Joe Barton's Apology Continues to Spark Upmar, Political Hotsheet,
CBS NEWS (June 18, 2010 10:22 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20008143-
503544.html.
119. David Hammer, Oil spill hearings: BP man on Deepwater Horizon rig refuses to testify,
says he will take the Fifth, TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 26, 2010, 6:34 PM), http://www.nola.con/
news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/05/oil-spill-hearingsbpman ond.html. MMS is now the Bu-
reau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement. See supra note 111 and
accompanying text.
120. Exxon Corporation pleaded guilty to criminal violations of the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act; Exxon Shipping Company pleaded guilty to criminal violations of the Clean Water Act, the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and the Refuse Act. Exxon Shipping Co. and Exxon Corp., No. 90-CR-
00015 (D. Alaska 1991); see also Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, Exxon to Pay Record One
Billion Dollars in Criminal Fines and Civil Damages in Connection with Alaskan Oil Spill (Mar. 13,
1991), available at http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/valdez/02.htm.
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when a less heralded oil spill despoiled the coast of Puerto Rico during the
Clinton administration, the Justice Department again brought criminal
charges.' 1 Prior to the Gulf oil spill, the two largest penalties ever imposed
for environmental crime were the $150 million fine imposed in the Exxon
Valdez casel22 and the $75 million fine imposed in the Puerto Rico oil spill
case.123 Because the Gulf oil spill involved far more oil, discharged over a
longer period of time, and caused much greater economic damage to coastal
communities, the argument for criminal prosecution of the Gulf oil spill is
stronger than it was for either the Exxon Valdez or Puerto Rico oil spills.124
Although a number of statutes were likely violated in the Gulf oil spill,
the Clean Water Act is the most significant from a pollution-prevention
standpoint and in terms of understanding the role of criminal enforcement
under the environmental laws. 12 The Clean Water Act prohibits any unper-
mitted discharge of oil into the exclusive economic zone of the United
States or in connection with activities governed by the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act "in such quantities as may be harmful as determined by the
President."126 By regulation, the EPA and the Coast Guard have defined
harmful quantities as discharges that cause a "sheen upon ... the surface
of the water or adjoining shorelines" or "sludge . . . beneath the
121. See Press Release, Guillermo Gil, U.S. Attorney, Three Corporations Fined $75 Million
for Puerto Rico Oil Spill: Largest Federal Environmental Crime Fine in U.S. History (Sept. 25,
1996), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/1996/Sept96/470enr.htm.
122. Exxon Shipping, No. 90-CR-00015; see also Peter J. Henning, Looking for Liability in
BP's Gulf Oil Spill, DealBook, N.Y TIMES (June 7, 2010, 9:30 AM), http://dealbook.
blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/looking-for-liability-in-bps-gulf-oil-spill/. Exxon Shipping was
sentenced to pay a fine of $125 million and Exxon Corporation was sentenced to pay a fine of $25
million, but $125 million of the total fine amount was remitted as restitution. Exxon Shipping, No.
90-CR-00015.
123. Criminal Docket for Case No. 3:95-cr-00084-ADC at 2-4, United States v. Rivera, 942
F. Supp. 732 (D.P.R. 1996) (No. 95-084 (HL)). Three corporate defendants, Bunker Group Puerto
Rico, Bunker Group, Inc., and New England Marine Services were sentenced to pay fines of twenty-
five million dollars per corporation for their roles in the Puerto Rico oil spill. Id. The third largest
penalty for environmental crime, prior to the Gulf oil spill, was the fifty million dollar fine imposed
on BP after an explosion and fire killed fifteen workers at BP's troubled Texas City refinery in 2005.
David Batty, BP agrees to pay $50m fine over Texas City deaths, GUARDIAN, Aug. 13, 2010, at 22.
124. The Gulf oil spill involved the discharge of twenty times more oil than the Exxon Valdez
oil spill, in which eleven million gallons of oil were discharged. See Chang, supra note 6. The Gulf
oil spill caused more economic damage because it affected the economy of an entire region. Id.
125. The Migratory Bird Treaty Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, and the Endangered
Species Act were also violated in the Gulf oil spill, but their prohibitions involve harm to wildlife,
not discharge of oil. See supra notes 20-26. Likewise, the Seaman's Manslaughter Act was violated
if the worker deaths resulted from negligence, willful misconduct, or inattention to duties, but the
statute applies to the worker deaths, not the spill itself. See id. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act governs drilling activities in the Gulf and therefore implicates whether the drilling was con-
ducted in a lawful manner. See id. Title 18 provisions regarding false statements and obstruction of
justice focus on interaction with regulators, and potential Title 18 fraud charges involve securities
regulation. See id.
126. Clean Water Act § 311 (b)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) (2006). See also discussion infra
Section IV.B.
surface of the water or upon adjoining shorelines."'27 If a prohibited dis-
charge occurs knowingly, which means that the defendant acted
intentionally and not as a result of mistake or accident, a felony violation of
the Clean Water Act occurs. 12 If a prohibited discharge results from the de-
fendant's negligence, a misdemeanor violation of the Clean Water Act
129
occurs.
The Justice Department typically charges knowing violations of the
Clean Water Act, as opposed to negligent violations, because it prefers to
focus its limited criminal enforcement resources on the charges that Con-
gress has deemed the most serious by making them felonies. 30 The problem
with this approach in the context of the Gulf oil spill is that none of the
companies involved intended to discharge oil into the Gulf. I have suggested
elsewhere that the government might argue that the discharges in the Gulf
oil spill occurred knowingly, because BP and its partners took so many risks
and deviated so much from industry practice that they knew a discharge
might occur."3 There is at least some evidence to support this view; one
Transocean employee who expressed concern about the drilling procedures
stated, "'I guess that's what we have those pinchers [the device on the blo-
wout preventer] for'" after his concerns went unaddressed.'32 Awareness that
a blowout (and subsequent discharge) might occur, however, is closer to
127. 40 C.F.R. § 110.3 (2010). The regulatory standard of causing a sheen on the surface of
the water or sludge below the surface of the water sets a relatively de minimis standard for harmful
discharge quantities in oil spill cases, which easily is met here.
128. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2). A knowing violation of the Clean Water Act requires proof
that the defendant knew about the discharge but does not require proof that the defendant knew the
discharge was unlawful. United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F3d 1275, 1283-86 (9th Cir. 1993); Unit-
ed States v. Sinskey, 119 F.3d 712, 715-19 (8th Cir. 1997). In the oil spill context, a knowing
violation would require proof that the defendant knew that a spill would occur but not that the dis-
charge required permits.
129. Id. § 1319(c)(1). To prove a negligent violation, the government would need to show that
the discharge occurred because the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care. United States v.
Ortiz, 427 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th
Cir. 1999).
130. See David M. Uhlmann, Prosecuting Worker Endangerment: The Need for Stronger
Criminal Penalties for Violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, ADVANCE: J. ACS
ISSUE GROUPS, Spring 2009, at 191, 198-99.
131. Uhlmann, Crimes on the Gulf, supra note 114; Uhlmann, Prosecuting Crimes Against
the Earth, supra note 114.
132. MSNBC.com News Servs., Worker: Transocean, BP argued before blast, MSNBC.coM
(May 26, 2010, 7:23 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37363106/ns/39428558.
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recklessness than intentional conduct,13 and recklessness is not a proxy for
knowledge under the Clean Water Act.134
It will be far easier to find negligence in the events leading to the Gulf
oil spill, particularly with regard to BP's conduct. As discussed in Part I
above, BP chose a single-tube well design that, while used safely in the past
and approved by MMS, provided fewer barriers to contain gas within the
well than other well designs. BP decided to use a single cement plug and
fewer centralizers than Halliburton recommended. BP cancelled a bond ce-
ment test that might have revealed problems with the cement seal. These
problems were compounded by other errors, including the failure to circu-
late drilling mud adequately, which helps the cement cure; the replacement
of drilling mud with seawater, which made it easier for gas to escape; and
the misreading of pressure tests conducted hours before the blowout, which
should have revealed the instability of the cement seal.'
BP has all but acknowledged its negligence-and has inculpated Trans-
ocean and Halliburton-in its internal investigation of the factors that
caused the Gulf oil spill.' 6 BP's admissions will make it easier for the Jus-
tice Department to prove negligence, although prosecutors may struggle to
identify a single negligent act or omission that caused the blowout. 17 Many
of the decisions that led to the blowout may be defensible when viewed in
isolation; it appears that the spill occurred more because of a combination of
missteps by the companies than because of a single, fateful, poor decision."
Yet such an aggregate theory of negligence would be consistent with princi-
ples of corporate criminal liability, which attribute all acts committed by
corporate employees or agents, within the scope of their employment or
133. "Recklessness" is a higher mens rea state than ordinary negligence. Recklessness occurs
when a defendant "consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that . . . will result
from his conduct." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962); see also BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
1385 (9th ed. 2009) (defining recklessness as "[c]onduct whereby the actor does not desire harmful
consequence but nonetheless foresees the possibility and consciously takes the risk . ... Reckless-
ness involves a greater degree of fault than negligence but a lesser degree of fault than intentional
wrongdoing.").
134. In contrast, willful blindness-which occurs when someone takes affirmative steps to
shield herself from facts that otherwise would be obvious-can substitute for knowledge. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1995) (defendant could not escape liability if
he "'deliberately and consciously avoided'" knowledge of the violation).
135. See supra notes 44-70 and accompanying text; see also Steven Mufson, Experts, rivals
blast BP's practices, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2010, at A04; David Hammer, 5 key human errors,
colossal mechanical failure led to fatal Gulf oil rig blowout, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Sept. 5, 2010, 6:00
AM), http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssfl2010/09/5_keyhuman__.errors_colossal_
me.html.
136. See INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM, supra note 92; see also Dina Cappiello et al., BP
report blames itself others for oil spill, NBC26, Sept. 8, 2010, http://www.nbc26.com/Globall
story.asp?S=13115835&clienttype=printable.
137. As the presidential commission noted, "irreducible uncertainty may persist regarding the
precise contribution to the blowout of each of several potentially immediate causes . . . ." NATIONAL
COMMIsSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 122. Of course, prosecutors may develop better evidence
since, unlike the presidential commission, they can use the subpoena power of the grand jury.
138. The presidential commission appears to have reached a similar conclusion by focusing
on the failure of industry management. See id.
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agency, to the corporation.' In addition, negligence is notoriously easy to
prove under the Clean Water Act, because courts have only required prose-
cutors to show ordinary negligence-the same failure to use reasonable care
that applies in tort cases-in criminal prosecutions under the Clean Water
Act.140
BP could challenge the government's position that ordinary negligence
is sufficient to impose criminal liability under the Clean Water Act, since
decisions by two federal courts of appeals' 4' do not constitute overwhelming
authority. Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit, where appeals in the Gulf oil spill case would be heard, has been
skeptical about the government's interpretation of the Clean Water Act in
other contexts.142 Yet BP seems unlikely to litigate the Gulf oil spill case,
particularly if it is only required to admit ordinary negligence as part of a
guilty plea. BP will be anxious to put the oil spill behind it as quickly as
possible in a way that preserves its ability to conduct drilling in the Gulf and
maintains its long-term viability as a company.
As a result, BP is likely to pursue a global settlement that resolves both
criminal and civil penalties for the Gulf oil spill (along with restitution and
natural resource damage claims). A settlement would allow BP to remove
uncertainty about its financial liabilities for the spill. BP could negotiate a
payment schedule that would make even multi-billion-dollar fines manage-
able. Conversely, litigating would come at an enormous cost for BP. In
addition to continued uncertainty about its financial obligations, BP would
squander the credit it would receive in plea negotiations for spearheading
cleanup efforts and accepting responsibility for its role in the tragedy. BP
would be unlikely to prevail at trial and would instead relive the nightmare
of the oil spill in a United States courthouse during 2012 or 2013.
139. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909);
United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1972); cf United States v. Bank
of New England, 821 F.2d. 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987) (upholding the "collective knowledge" doctrine,
which attributes to a corporation the knowledge of all its employees and agents).
140. See United States v. Ortiz, 427 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that a person
"violates the [Clean Water Act] by failing to exercise the degree of care that someone of ordinary
prudence would have exercised in the same circumstances, and, in so doing, discharges any
pollutant into United States waters [in violation of the Act]"); United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d
1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Congress intended that a person who acts with ordinary negligence in
violating 33 U.S.C. § 132 1(b)(3) may be subject to criminal penalties.").
141. See Ortiz, 427 F.3d 1278 (Tenth Circuit); Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116 (Ninth Circuit). In
this regard, it should be noted that the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Hanousek over the dissent
of Justices Thomas and O'Connor. Hanousek v. United States, 528 U.S. 1102 (2000) (denying cer-
tiorari). It is uncertain whether the same result would occur today given the changes in the Court's
membership.
142. See In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 345 (5th Cir. 2003) (rejecting government arguments
about the scope of federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act); United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d
386, 390-91 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting government arguments about knowledge requirements in a
criminal prosecution under the Clean Water Act and government claims that violation of the Clean
Water Act is a public welfare offense).
143. An alternative for BP would be to challenge the governing legal standard in pretrial
motions under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See generally James Fal-
lows Tierney, Comment, Summary Dismissals, 77 U. CHI. L. REv. 1841 (2010). If the court requires
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Transocean and Halliburton might have more incentives to challenge the
government's interpretation of the Clean Water Act's negligence provisions
and to contest their criminal responsibility for the Gulf oil spill. They will
argue that they protested BP's efforts to deviate from industry norms. For
example, Transocean disagreed with BP about how to remove drilling mud
and replace it with seawater.'" Halliburton wanted to use more centralizer
rods but was overruled by BP.145 Moreover, Transocean and Halliburton will
claim that criminal charges against them would overlook the reality of how
drilling is conducted. The well owners, not the rig operators and contractors,
have the final say in all drilling matters.146
Ultimately, the fact that Transocean and Halliburton raised concerns
about the well closure procedures may mitigate their responsibility, in terms
of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, but does not exculpate them from
criminal liability. Mitigation is appropriate because Transocean and Halli-
burton objected when BP deviated from industry norms and thus
demonstrated greater concern for safe practices. But the concerns they
raised also demonstrate that Transocean and Halliburton knew there was a
risk of a blowout and possible spill. Whether they were reluctant partici-
pants in negligent conduct does not create a defense to claims that their
conduct was also negligent. Both companies acceded to BP's requests and
are accountable for doing so. Indeed, the government will use the Gulf oil
spill case to establish precedent that drilling companies and their contractors
have safety and environmental obligations and cannot shirk those responsi-
bilities out of fealty to the demands of the well owner.147
The ability to charge negligence under the Clean Water Act-and seek
record criminal fines against BP, Transocean, and Halliburton-essentially
decides the question whether there will be criminal charges for the Gulf oil
spill.148 The same factors that compel an investigation-the deaths, the size
a heightened showing of negligence, the government would need to obtain a new indictment and
would face a more difficult evidentiary burden at trial. If the court follows Hanousek and Ortiz and
requires only ordinary negligence, BP could still plead guilty, although it would not receive as much
credit for cooperation during plea negotiations with the government.
144. Miguel Bustillo, Big Spat on Rig Preceded Explosion, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2010, at A7.
145. Robbie Brown, Adviser Says He Raised Concerns to BP on Well, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 25,
2010, atAl3.
146. See Ed Crooks, BPs role in Deepwater Horizon drilling highlighted by contractors, FIN.
TIMEs Energy Source Blog (May 11, 2010, 1:48 PM), http://blogs.ft.com/energy-source/2010/05/ Il/
bps-role-in-deepwater-horizon-drilling-highlighted-by-contractors/. An exception occurs when the
rig operator feels that the safety of the vessel would be compromised by actions demanded by the
well owner.
147. See infra notes 203-211 and accompanying text.
148. As a matter of prosecutorial discretion, the Justice Department usually does not charge
criminal violations of strict liability statutes such as the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (and the Refuse
Act) unless there is negligence, which reflects the view that criminal prosecution should be reserved
for cases where there is at least some evidence of wrongdoing. Uhlmann, Crimes on the Gulf, supra
note 114, at 31. Given the evidence of negligence in the Gulf oil spill, however, the government is
likely to charge Migratory Bird Treaty Act violations, proof of which will require the government to
show only that the defendants' actions led to the taking of a migratory bird-a strict liability stan-
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of the spill, the ecological destruction, and the economic losses-will con-
vince the Justice Department to prosecute once it concludes that there is
sufficient evidence to prove negligence beyond a reasonable doubt. Stated
differently, the Justice Department cannot fail to use the primary criminal
enforcement authority provided by Congress for oil spill cases when con-
fronted with the worst accidental oil spill in history.
The fact that the Justice Department has already filed a civil suit based
on the Gulf oil spill does not diminish the likelihood of a criminal case. In
most cases, the Justice Department chooses between criminal and civil
enforcement after weighing the seriousness "of the violation, the complexity
of the underlying law, and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion."'l 49 Elect-
ing remedies allows the government to use its resources more efficiently and
reflects the view that deterrence does not require a defendant to face crimi-
nal and civil sanctions for the same conduct. However, the Justice
Department has a long-standing policy of seeking criminal and civil penal-
ties in what it views as the most egregious cases, and the Gulf oil spill meets
that test."'
Moreover, BP has a history of criminal violations, which will influence
how prosecutors exercise their discretion. In 1999, BP pleaded guilty to fail-
ing to report the release of hazardous substances into the environment at an
oil field in Alaska.'-' In 2007, BP pleaded guilty to failing to maintain a safe
workplace in violation of the Clean Air Act after fifteen workers died during
an explosion at its Texas City refinery. BP also pleaded guilty in 2007 to
Clean Water Act violations after corroded pipelines caused an oil spill in
Alaska's Prudhoe Bay.' Though BP will argue that those convictions in-
volved different BP subsidiaries, they nonetheless raise questions about BP's
overall commitment to safe operations. 154 The Justice Department has identi-
fied a corporation's past history, including the history of related corporate
dard. With thousands, if not millions, of birds coated in oil, evidence to support such strict liability
violations is readily available.
149. Id. at 32.
150. Id.
151. See United States v. BP Exploration (Alaska), Inc., No. A99-0141CR(JKS) (D. Alaska
1999) (criminal violations of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq.). BP acknowledged in the plea
agreement that it had provided "inadequate oversight and supervision" of environmental, health, and
safety requirements and agreed to implement a national environmental compliance program at BP
facilities, including its deepwater drilling operations in the Gulf of Mexico. Id.
152. United States v. BP Prods. N. Am. Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 655, 660 (S.D. Tex. 2009). In-
vestigators concluded that BP had failed to follow its own safety procedures. Id. at 664-65.
153. Press Release, Nelson P. Cohen, U.S. Attorney, Dist. of Alaska, British Petroleum Explo-
ration (Alaska) Agrees to Plead Guilty to a Criminal Violation of the Clean Water Act and Pay $20
Million in Criminal Penalties (Oct. 25, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/usaolak/press/
October%202007/BPXA_071025.pdf.
154. "Since 2007, according to analysis by the Center for Public Integrity, BP has received
760 citations for 'egregious and willful' safety violations-those 'committed with plain indifference
to or intentional disregard for employee safety and health.'" Dickinson, supra note 51, at 59-60.
During the same time period, the rest of the oil industry received only one citation. See id. at 60.
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entities, as one of the factors that prosecutors must consider in the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion.'
Transocean does not have a criminal history, and, as noted above, its
employees initially raised objections to many of the decisions that led to the
Gulf oil spill.' As the presidential commission emphasized, however,
Transocean did experience a similar incident on one of its North Sea rigs
that should have prompted it to be more vigilant.5 7 Transocean fared poorly
in safety audits that it commissioned prior to the Deepwater Horizon trag-
edy,58 and it failed to conduct required inspections of the blowout preventer,
which was equipped with only one shearing ram (two shearing rams, al-
though not required, provide better protection).' Perhaps most significantly,
Transocean employees carried out most of the questionable decisions made
by BP. Because Transocean was involved in so much of the conduct that
caused the spill, and because it was responsible for safe operation of the
Deepwater Horizon and maintenance of the faulty blowout preventer, it is
all but certain that Transocean will face criminal charges as well.
Halliburton initially appeared to be in a good position to argue that it
should not be criminally prosecuted for its role in the Gulf oil spill. Halli-
burton had none of the authority that BP possessed to make decisions about
well design and drilling protocols. Halliburton was not the drilling company
and therefore, unlike Transocean, did not have extensive involvement in car-
rying out BP's decisions. Attorneys for Halliburton will argue that its role
was so limited-and its actions proscribed to such a great extent by BP-
that it should not be charged. On the other hand, the failure of the cement
seal was one of the primary causes of the blowout. Halliburton acceded to
BP's questionable decisions regarding the centralizer rods and failed to ad-
dress test results indicating that its cement was unstable.'6 It also will not
help Halliburton that it was under scrutiny in earlier high-profile cases but
avoided criminal prosecution.161 It therefore is increasingly likely that Halli-
burton will face criminal charges for the Gulf oil spill.
155. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, tit. 9, ch. 28.600 (2008).
While the history of related companies is relevant to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, it is
unlikely that evidence of prior violations by other BP subsidiaries would be admissible in a trial
involving BP Exploration and Production. If such evidence were admissible, it could not be used to
show that BP Exploration and Production acted in conformity with the past misconduct of other BP
entities. Evidence of prior bad acts could only be used "for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." FED.
R. EVID. 404(b).
156. See supra notes 130, 142 and accompanying text.
157. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 124.
158. See Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill (2010), supra note 81.
159. Id.; see also David Barstow et al., Regulators Failed to Address Risks in Oil Rig Fail-Safe
Device, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2010, at Al (noting unfortunate "decision years before to outfit the
Deepwater Horizon's blowout preventer with just one blind shear ram when other rigs were already
beginning to use two").
160. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., James Glanz, Report Adds to Criticism of Halliburton's Iraq Role, N.Y. TIMES,
March 29, 2006, at A8 (discussing two of Halliburton's controversial Iraqi oil contracts).
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In sum, criminal prosecution of the Gulf oil spill will occur because
there is ample evidence to prove negligence, because the spill involved pro-
hibited discharges of oil in unprecedented amounts, and because the spill
resulted in extensive environmental harm and economic damage. Although
it is doubtful that the government can pursue felony charges under the Clean
Water Act, the negligence standard does not set a high bar for criminal
prosecution, which increases the likelihood that BP, Transocean, and Halli-
burton will face criminal charges.162
III. PARADIGMS LOST: THE GULF OIL SPILL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT NORMS
The Gulf spill is one of the epic environmental events in our nation's
history, along with the Cuyahoga River fire and the Santa Barbara oil spill in
the 1960s, Love Canal and Times Beach in the 1970s, and the Exxon Valdez
oil spill in the 1980s.1' A major distinction between the Gulf oil spill and
earlier environmental catastrophes is that only the Exxon Valdez oil spill
resulted in a criminal case; the other incidents occurred before our modem
environmental statutes were enacted, so the conduct involved was not ille-
gal.' Moreover, while the Exxon spill resulted in a criminal prosecution, the
case arose during the early years of the environmental crimes program-just
two years after the Justice Department created its Environmental Crimes
Section. 16 Today, the environmental crimes program is much more estab-
lished, which means that prosecutors have a better sense of how to
exercise their discretion to determine which violations warrant prosecution.
Another major difference between previous environmental tragedies and
the Gulf oil spill is the explosion of information sources that has occurred
162. Criminal investigators will also review the conduct of Anadarko and Mitsui, the minority
owners of the Macondo well. It does not appear, however, that either company was involved in
decisions about how to conduct the drilling or was involved in the operation of the well. Absent
evidence to the contrary, Anadarko and Mitsui will not be prosecuted criminally, although they are
defendants in the Justice Department's civil suit and will face civil penalties under the Clean Water
Act § 311, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2006), and liability as a responsible party under the Oil Pollution Act,
33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2704.
163. It is unlikely the Gulf oil spill will have a similar galvanizing effect on environmental
law. The Clean Water Act Amendments of 1972 were in major part a response to the Cuyahoga
River and Santa Barbara incidents; the tragedies of Love Canal and Times Beach helped spur the
Superfund law (i.e., CERCLA) in 1980; and the Exxon Valdez brought the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
(and with it enhanced civil penalties of $1,100 to $4,300 per barrel for oil spill cases). The House of
Representatives passed legislation in response to the Gulf oil spill in July 2010, but the Senate never
took action on the bill, and its prospects are dim. For a discussion of the roles of the Cuyahoga
River, the Santa Barbara oil spill, and Love Canal in the modem environmental law movement, see
Richard J. Lazarus, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2004).
164. See generally Uhlmann, supra note 113, at 1224, 1228.
165. In 1982, the Justice Department established an Environmental Crimes Unit in the Envi-
ronmental Enforcement Section of the Lands and Natural Resources Division. ENV'T & NATURAL
RES. Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC LANDS AND NATURAL TREASURES: THE FIRST 100 YEARS
OF THE ENVIRONMENT & NATURAL RESOURCEs DIvIsIoN 1909-2009, at 57-58 (2009). In 1987, the
Environmental Crimes Unit became the Environmental Crimes Section. Id.
166. See David M. Uhlmann, Strange Bedfellows, ENvTL. F, May/June 2008, at 40,44.
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over the last twenty years. Never before has so much of the general public
been exposed over such a long period of time to so many news stories, pho-
tographs, and videos of an environmental tragedy in newspapers, on
television, and over the internet. Photographs of wildlife coated in oil are
indelible memories from the Exxon Valdez spill, but images of oil gushing
from the floor of the Gulf and cleanup crews on coastal beaches are part of
the public lore in ways that were not possible even as recently as 1989.
The Gulf oil spill will be the most significant environmental case ever
prosecuted and easily the most renowned. It involves one of the worst envi-
ronmental disasters in our history, it was witnessed by millions, and it will
produce record penalties. In cases of corporate crime, the significance of the
case is often measured by the size of the penalties. Using that metric, no
prior environmental case will be in the same category as the Gulf oil spill. A
criminal fine of even one billion dollars would be seven times larger than the
fine imposed in the Exxon Valdez case. A relatively modest penalty of
three billion dollars-modest because BP already has agreed to set aside
twenty billion dollars to cover anticipated economic losses and natural re-
source damages from the spill 6 9-would be twenty times larger than the
Exxon Valdez sentence and more than two times larger than the prior record
for all corporate crimes. 70
Yet a multi-billion-dollar criminal fine for BP is likely. Under the Alter-
native Fines Act,'7 ' a provision of federal sentencing law that applies to all
federal crimes but is not widely known outside the Justice Department and
the corporate defense bar, the maximum criminal penalty will be twice the
losses associated with the Gulf oil spill.172 The Alternative Fines Act does
167. See Russell Mokhiber, Top 100 Corporate Criminals of the Decade, CORPORATE CRIME
REPORTER, http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/topl00.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2011).
168. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
169. See Ian Urbina, BP Settlements Likely to Shield Top Defendants, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 20,
2010, at Al.
170. As noted above, the largest fine for corporate crime in the United States was $1.3 billion,
which Pfizer paid in 2009. See Harris, supra note 29.
171. Alternative Fines Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (2006).
172. Under federal sentencing law, the maximum sentence for organizational defendants is the
greater of (1) the amount set forth in the statute of conviction; (2) $500,000 per felony count or
$200,000 per misdemeanor count; or (3) twice the loss or gain associated with the offense. See id.
The maximum criminal penalty under the Clean Water Act is $50,000 per day for a felony violation,
Clean Water Act § 309(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (2006), and $25,000 per day for a misde-
meanor violation, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1). For a spill that lasted 100 days, the per diem fines under
the Clean Water Act provide a maximum penalty of $5 million for felony violations and $2.5 million
for misdemeanor violations, far less than twice the losses associated with the oil spill. Likewise, if
each day of the 100-day oil spill were charged separately, the maximum fine based on the per count
amounts provided by federal sentencing law would be $50 million for felony violations and $20
million for misdemeanor violations-still far less than the multi-billion-dollar fine authorized under
the loss doubling provisions of the Alternative Fines Act. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c)(3) (setting
maximum fine of $500,000 for an organizational defendant convicted of a felony violation), id.
§ 3571 (c)(4) (setting maximum fine of $500,000 for an organizational defendant convicted of a
misdemeanor violation resulting in death), and id. § 3571 (c)(5) (setting a maximum fine of
$250,000 for an organizational defendant convicted of a Class A misdemeanor), with id. § 3571(d)
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not define what constitutes "losses associated with the offense," but it would
be appropriate to include at least all economic losses and natural resource
damages from the spill, since the unpermitted discharge of oil is the offense
prohibited by the Clean Water Act. Although the full extent of economic
losses and natural resource damages may not be known for years, the maxi-
mum criminal penalty would be forty billion dollars if the twenty billion
dollars that BP agreed to place in escrow to pay damages from the spill
proves to be an accurate estimate. BP would negotiate for a lower figure, but
a criminal fine that is not in the billions of dollars would be out of propor-
tion with the damage wrought by BP's crimes."3
The Gulf oil spill will therefore have a significant role in shaping socie-
tal perceptions of environmental crime. For most Americans, the Gulf oil
spill-bookended by the Exxon Valdez oil spill twenty-one years earlier-
will become the classic example of environmental crime. To be sure, there
are ways the Gulf oil spill is typical of environmental crime. The fact that it
involves corporations is beyond paradigmatic; the overwhelming majority of
environmental crimes-at least where violations of the antipollution laws
are concerned-are committed by corporations. Not all of those corpora-
tions are among the top ten of the Global Fortune 500 companies,174 but the
Justice Department has regularly prosecuted major corporations for envi-
ronmental crime, including Exxon,"' Rockwell,7  International Paper,
Royal Caribbean,7' Koch Petroleum, Tyson Foods,'so W.R. Grace," and
Citgo.182
Environmental crimes are usually committed by companies that do not
place sufficient emphasis on environmental compliance, and the Gulf oil
spill is no exception. For years, BP stressed production and efficiency over
safety and failed to address systemic problems in its environmental compli-
ance programs even after criminal (and civil) violations occurred at BP
(setting maximum fine of twice the gross pecuniary gain or gross pecuniary loss associated with an
offense).
173. A multi-billion-dollar criminal fine will be just one component of BP's sentence. The
sentence is also likely to include restitution and community service projects that will supplement the
natural resource damage claims paid in the civil suit. As a result, the total criminal sentence-a
combination of fines, restitution, and restoration projects-may reach into the tens of billions of
dollars. See infra notes 239-240 and accompanying text.
174. BP was the fourth-largest company in the world during 2010, according to Fortune Mag-
azine. See Fortune Global 500: World's Largest Corporations 1-100, FORTUNE, July 26, 2010, at F-
1, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2010/.
175. Exxon Shipping Co. and Exxon Corp., No. 90-CR-00015 (D. Alaska 1991).
176. Rockwell Int'l Corp., No. 1:92-CR-00107, (D. Colo. 1992).
177. Int'l Paper Co., No. 1:91-CR-00051, (D. Me. 1991).
178. United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
179. Koch Petroleum Group, LP, No. 2:00-CR-00325 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
180. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 03-CR-00203 (W.D. Mo. 2003).
181. W.R. Grace & Co., No. 05-CR-0007 (D. Mont. 2009) (acquittal).
182. Citgo Petroleum Corp., No. 2:06-CR-00563 (S.D. Tex.) (not yet sentenced).
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facilities.'" As discussed in Part II, the presidential commission concluded
that the root causes of the Gulf oil spill were management failures at BP,
Transocean, and Halliburton that led to poor risk assessment, missed warn-
ing signals, and flawed decision making that collectively led to tragedy.
Second, the Gulf oil spill will resemble other environmental crimes if
the charges include criminal violations of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act. If BP and the other companies involved in the spill committed criminal
violations of federal drilling laws, the case will be more like a classic envi-
ronmental crime because it would involve the flouting of rules enacted to
protect our environment from harmful activities. The civil lawsuit filed by
the Justice Department in December 2010 alleges numerous violations of
drilling laws, including failure to take precautions to maintain well control,
failure to use the best available and safest drilling technology, and failure to
maintain equipment and materials such as the blowout preventer.18 If those
violations occurred knowingly and willfully, they could be charged as crim-
inal violations of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.186
As discussed in Part I, however, much of the conduct that was at the
heart of the alleged negligence-for example, the well design, the use of a
blowout preventer with a single shearing ram, and the depth of the cement
plug-occurred with the knowledge and approval of MMS.' The acquies-
cence of regulatory officials does not mean that there were no violations;
regulators have neither the ability to impose requirements that do not exist
nor the ability to authorize conduct that is contrary to statutory or regulatory
requirements. Moreover, significant concerns have been raised about wheth-
er MMS regulators had improper relationships with the companies that they
were supposed to regulate.'" Nonetheless, unless the companies involved in
183. See Press Release, Nat'l Comm'n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore
Drilling, Co-Chairman Bob Graham's Opening Statement from Nov. 9 Hearing (Nov. 9, 2010)
("The problem here is that there was a culture that did not promote safety and that culture failed.");
Press Release, Nat'l Comm'n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling, Co-
Chairman William K. Reilly's Opening Statement from Nov. 9 Hearing (Nov. 9, 2010) ("BP has
been notoriously challenged on matters of process safety."). See generally NAT'L ACADS., supra note
50. BP has a long history of a troubled corporate culture. Confidential investigations into BP's Alas-
kan oil operations identified instances in which management tolerated aging equipment of
questionable safety, induced employees not to report problems, and shortened or put off inspections
to cut production costs. Abrahm Lustgarten & Ryan Knutson, Reports at BP over years find history
of problems, WASH. POST, June 8, 2010, at AOl. A 2001 report revealed that BP had neglected emer-
gency shutdown equipment, including valves and detectors like those that could have thwarted the
Deepwater Horizon accident. Id. Another report, from 2004, found that potential whistleblowers
were being systematically intimidated. The 200,000-gallon Prudhoe Bay pipeline spill of 2006-the
largest ever on Alaska's North Slope-occurred under this troubled culture. During the same period,
similar problems surfaced at BP facilities in California and Texas. Id.
184. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
185. Complaint of the United States of America at V 47-56, United States v. BP Exploration
& Prod. Inc., 2:10-cv-04536-CJB-SS (E.D. La. Dec. 15, 2010) (alleging violations of 30 C.F.R.
§ 250).
186. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act § 24(c), 43 U.S.C. § 1350(c) (2006).
187. See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
188. Dickinson, supra note 51, at 56.
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the Gulf oil spill misled or colluded with regulators, the involvement of
MMS officials makes it difficult to claim that BP, Transocean, and Hallibur-
ton knowingly and willfully violated federal drilling laws. A willful
violation requires proof that the defendant acted with knowledge that its
conduct was unlawful," which would be difficult to show if the governing
regulatory agency approved the unlawful conduct.
A third way that the Gulf oil spill could resemble a typical environ-
mental case is if the charges include false statements, fraud, or obstruction
of justice in violation of Title 18 of the United States Code.'90 The criminal
investigation of the Gulf oil spill includes the question whether BP, Trans-
ocean, and Halliburton were truthful in their communications with the
government in the months and weeks before the spill occurred, as well as
during the days and weeks after the spill began. If any of the companies lied
to the government or concealed material facts from regulators, false state-
ments and obstruction of justice charges could be brought against the
companies and any individuals who engaged in misleading conduct. The
government must be able to prove that the conduct was intentional-for ex-
ample, a mistaken belief that the well was discharging 5,000 barrels of oil
per day when in fact it was discharging 35,000 barrels of oil would not be a
false statement or obstruction of justice. On the other hand, if corporate offi-
cials obtained regulatory approvals by withholding information about
conditions at the well or if they deliberately underreported the amount of oil
gushing from the well, false statement and obstruction of justice charges
could be pursued. Inclusion of charges involving "lying, cheating, and steal-
ing" would make the Gulf oil spill case similar to other corporate
.191prosecutions of regulatory cnme.
Yet in myriad other ways the Gulf oil spill is an aberrational environ-
mental crime, with conduct that was not as egregious, harm that was far
worse, and penalties that bear no relation to norms for environmental crime.
The Justice Department, armed with criminal investigators, grand jury au-
thority, and subpoena power, could uncover deliberate regulatory violations
or false statements and obstruction of justice. Absent such evidence, how-
ever, the Gulf oil spill case is a negligence case that is criminal because the
negligence caused breathtaking harm, not because negligence is usually
criminal under the environmental laws.
Under the environmental laws, negligence is only criminal under the
Clean Water Act and a seldom-used provision of the Clean Air Act that
makes it a misdemeanor to negligently release a hazardous air pollutant and
thereby negligently place another person in imminent danger of death and
189. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998).
190. Uhlmann, supra note 113, at 1248-49.
191. See generally STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING: A MORAL THEORY
OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME (2006). In addition, news reports have indicated that the Criminal Divi-
sion of the Justice Department is investigating whether corporate officials understated the amount of
oil spilled in an effort to bolster stock prices or engaged in insider training. See, e.g., Hammer, supra
note 26. If fraud charges result, the case would be more typical of corporate crime cases generally.
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serious bodily injury. 192 In all other respects, the major environmental stat-
utes only impose criminal liability for knowing or intentional conduct. For
example, under the federal hazardous waste laws, it is a crime to knowingly
treat, store, or dispose of hazardous waste without a permit or in violation of
permit conditions; negligent treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous
waste without a permit or in violation of permit conditions is not a crime.193
Under the Clean Air Act, it is a crime to knowingly violate any of the Act's
requirements regarding air pollution; negligent violations of the restrictions
imposed by the Act are not crimes. 94 It is a crime under all of the environ-
mental statutes to knowingly make false statements in permit applications or
in required reports or to knowingly fail to maintain required records; negli-
gent conduct in the same context is not criminal. 95
Moreover, when negligence is charged under the Clean Water Act, it of-
ten involves intentional conduct where there is an issue about whether the
defendant had all of the knowledge required under the Clean Water Act. In
United States v. Ortiz, one of the two appellate court decisions that analyzed
the standard of proof required to show negligence under the Clean Water
Act, the defendant had dumped industrial waste into a toilet.1 96 There was no
question about his intent to dispose of the waste, but he claimed that he
thought the toilet was not connected to the sewer system. Since a knowing
violation of the Clean Water Act's pretreatment rules regarding discharges
into the sewer system requires showing that the defendant knew his dis-
charges had entered the sewer system, the United States only charged Mr.
Ortiz with negligence, even though he had disposed of his waste intention-
ally.1
Other cases where negligence is charged under the Clean Water Act fre-
quently involve either initial charges of knowing violations that are pleaded
down to negligence or a decision to enter a preindictment plea agreement on
negligence charges, even though there is evidence of knowing violations. An
empirical study of Clean Water Act negligence cases from 1987 to 2000
determined that less than 7 percent of all environmental prosecutions in-
volved negligence-and that nearly half of those cases (53 out of 117) also
192. Clean Air Act § 113(c)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(4) (2006).
193. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 § 3008(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)
(2006).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1).
195. E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(4) (2006) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3) (Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2) (Clean Air Act). Another
example is the Superfund law, which makes it a crime to fail to report the release of a reportable
quantity of a hazardous substance into the environment as soon as the defendant knows of the re-
lease. 42 U.S.C. § 9603. If the defendant did not know about the release, even if the defendant were
negligent in failing to learn about the release, there would be no crime.
196. 427 F.3d 1278, 1280, 1283 (10th Cir. 2005). The other case is United States v. Hanousek,
176 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 1999).
197. When Mr. Ortiz continued his unpermitted discharges even after he had been told by
inspectors that his discharges were entering the Colorado River through the sewer system, he was
charged with felonies. See Ortiz, 427 F.3d at 1281.
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involved knowing conduct.'" The study concluded that prosecutors showed
"restraint" in bringing negligence charges and only did so in cases where
there was (1) catastrophic harm, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill; (2) gross
negligence that resulted in significant harm; (3) knowing acts of pollution
pleaded down to negligence; or (4) negligence that occurred along with
knowing violations such as false statements or obstruction of justice.'
The Gulf oil spill is an atypical environmental crime for other reasons as
well, at least insofar as the focus is on charges based on the spill itself. Most
environmental crimes are felonies, and, like their counterparts in other fed-
eral law enforcement programs, environmental prosecutors avoid
misdemeanor cases.2 Yet environmental charges based on the spill are like-
ly to be misdemeanors, which is ironic since it is the losses attributable to
the spill that will make the criminal fine so large. Felony charges may be
brought under the Seaman's Manslaughter Statute20 1 for the worker deaths
that occurred on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig. Felonies also are pos-
sible under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act if there were knowing
and willful violations of drilling rules, or under Title 18 of the United States
Code if prosecutors can demonstrate that corporate officials misled regula-
tors either before or after the spill.202 But the Clean Water Act charges-as
well as any wildlife crimes charged under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, the
Marine Mammal Protection Act, or the Endangered Species Act-will likely
be misdemeanors because the discharges occurred negligently.
Still another way that the Gulf oil spill may be different from most envi-
ronmental crimes involves whether individuals will be charged. Prosecutors
prefer to charge individuals in cases involving corporate crime, because the
deterrent value of criminal prosecution is greater when corporate officials
face incarceration.203 Corporate officials are more likely to comply with the
law when they fear that they may go to jail if their violations are discovered.
Moreover, where a loss of personal freedom may result, corporate officials
are less likely to discount the possibility of being caught, since the costs of
being wrong are so great. If the only sanction is a monetary fine paid by the
corporation, the same official may weigh the costs of paying a fine against
the costs of complying with the law-and also may be more willing to
198. Steven P. Solow & Ronald A. Sarachan, Criminal Negligence Prosecutions Under the
Federal Clean Water Act: A Statistical Analysis and an Evaluation of the Impact of Hanousek and
Hong, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,153, 11,155-59 (2002).
199. Id. at 11,158-59. The study also found that, as the environmental crimes program ma-
tured, there may be a trend toward less frequent use of "pure" negligence charges. Id. at 11,157.
200. Most misdemeanor cases under the environmental laws involve wildlife crime, since
most criminal provisions of the wildlife protection statutes are limited to misdemeanors. A notable
exception is the Lacey Act, which makes it a felony to knowingly sell or knowingly purchase pro-
tected fish, wildlife, or plants. Lacey Act § 4(d), 16 U.S.C. § 3373(d) (2006). Another less
frequently utilized felony provision of the wildlife laws is the Migratory Bird Treaty Act provision
prohibiting the sale of migratory birds. Migratory Bird Treaty Act § 6, 16 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006).
201. 18 U.S.C. § 1115 (2006).
202. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
203. Uhlmann, Crimes on the Gulf, supra note 114, at 32.
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discount the possibility of a fine based on her assessment of the risk that the
violations will be discovered. Indeed, it could be argued that the prior crimi-
nal cases against BP failed to change its corporate culture precisely because
no individuals were prosecuted.
Absent false statements or obstruction of justice, however, the Justice
Department may struggle to identify culpable individuals who possessed
sufficient management authority in the Gulf oil spill. Unless the government
departs from its prior practice and charges strict liability violations of the
204Migratory Bird Treaty Act, only those directly involved in the oil spill can
be charged with crimes. To charge individuals with a criminal violation of
the Clean Water Act-the primary statute for addressing the spill-the gov-
ernment would need to show that the defendants acted knowingly (for
felony charges) or negligently (for misdemeanor charges). Yet it is unlikely
that senior executives of BP, Transocean, and Halliburton, who had the
greatest influence over the corporate culture that made the spill possible,
205played such a personal role in the disaster.
The question therefore becomes whether the government can identify
individuals with enough supervisory responsibility and personal involve-
ment to be blamed for the Gulf tragedy. The president's commission on the
Gulf oil spill identified a number of shore-based engineers, supervisory per-
sonnel on the rig, and rig workers who were involved in the questionable
decisions and the inadequate monitoring that contributed to the blowout.206 If
past cases are a guide, however, the Justice Department will not prosecute
rig workers who carried out decisions by their supervisors, unless they made
false statements or obstructed justice, because those individuals are needed
as witnesses. The Justice Department may look more closely at the role of
the shore-side engineers, but those engineers appear to have been merely
technical advisors; they too may be more valuable as witnesses. That leaves
only the supervisors on the rig as potential defendants, unless the Justice
Department develops evidence that corporate executives were directing their
activities.
There is precedent for prosecuting supervisory personnel on vessels-
the functional equivalent of supervisors on the rig-for environmental
crimes. As part of its vessel-pollution initiative,207 the Justice Department
has prosecuted captains and chief engineers who were supervisory officials
204. Under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, the unauthorized taking of migratory birds is a
strict liability misdemeanor, which allows prosecutors to charge responsible corporate officials
without evidence that they knew about the violations or acted negligently in their supervision of the
activity that resulted in the unauthorized taking. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 703, 706. Historically, the Justice
Department has not prosecuted pollution cases under strict liability theories absent negligence. See
Uhlmann, Crimes on the Gulf, supra note 114, at 31. It therefore is unlikely that the government
would charge corporate officials with Migratory Bird Treaty Act violations in the Gulf oil spill
unless the individuals involved acted negligently.
205. Uhlmann, Crimes on the Gulf, supra note 114, at 32; Uhlmann, Prosecuting Crimes
Against the Earth, supra note 114.
206. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 89-127.
207. Uhlmann, supra note 166, at 42.
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208
on ships that were polluting. If the Gulf oil spill were treated like a vessel-
pollution case, BP's well site leaders (the "company men" on the rig) and
Transocean's supervisors could be prosecuted if they made the negligent
decisions that were responsible for the blowout.
The analogy to vessel pollution cases may not be applicable, however,
because the vessel pollution defendants were charged with knowing or in-
tentional conduct, including false statements and obstruction of justice.209 If
the managers on the rig only engaged in negligent conduct, should they be
charged in an unintentional oil spill that resulted from a corporate culture
over which they had no control? It also may be difficult to argue that the
negligence of a single individual or group of individuals caused the spill,
since it is not clear which negligent acts triggered the blowout. As noted in
Part II, the fact that the spill had multiple causes would be no defense to
corporate negligence claims, since the acts of all corporate employees and
agents can be attributed to the corporation.21 But the same aggregate theory
of liability cannot be used against individuals who, absent evidence of a
conspiracy, are responsible only for their own actions.21
Moreover, the Gulf oil spill presents a significant proportionality prob-
lem for prosecutors considering charges against individuals. Because the
spill resulted in such an environmental disaster and has received so much
national and international attention, charging individuals would carry enor-
mous weight. The government would be saying that a relatively small
number of individuals are culpable for what has been termed the worst envi-
212
ronmental disaster in U.S. history. Of course, fairness concerns are not a
legal defense to criminal charges, but they could influence how prosecutors
exercise their discretion and how a jury perceives charges against individual
defendants. To prosecute individuals successfully, the evidence of personal
guilt must be both compelling and overwhelming.
As a result, unless there is evidence of communications between shore-
side management and supervisors on the rig that would inculpate a large
number of individual defendants, including some within senior manage-
ment, the Gulf oil spill could be a corporate-only disposition. By itself that
would not make the case an outlier; a number of major prosecutions of
208. See, e.g., United States v. Jho, 534 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2008). Mr. Kun Yun Jho was the
chief engineer on a ship that transferred bulk petroleum from offshore tankers to ports along the
Gulf of Mexico. He was responsible for engine department operations and for maintaining the ship's
oil-record log. Id. at 400.
209. See id. at 401.
210. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
211. See generally United States v. Sinskey, 119 F.3d 712, 718-19 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that
aiding and abetting liability defendant must participate in unlawful activity).
212. Address to the Nation on the Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 502 (June 15, 2010) (statement of President Obama) ("Already, this oil spill is the worst
environmental disaster America has ever faced."); Gulf of Mexico oil leak 'worst US environment
disaster', BBC NEWS (May 30, 2010, 4:49 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10194335 (statement
of White House energy advisor Carol M. Browner to NBC's Meet The Press) ("More oil is leaking
in the Gulf of Mexico than at any other time in our history. It means there is more oil than the Exxon
Valdez (in Alaska in 1989).").
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coTorations have not resulted in the simultaneous prosecution of individu-
als. " But it is one more way that the Gulf oil spill would stand apart from
paradigmatic environmental crime.
What the Gulf oil spill may lack in terms of intentional conduct, felony
environmental violations, and individual defendants, it more than makes up
in terms of harm. The worst tragedies often make the best cases, because the
harm that occurs demonstrates why the underlying conduct is criminal. Jury
appeal is greatest in cases where unlawful conduct results in significant
harm to public health or the environment.214 The Gulf oil spill involves sig-
nificant harm in both respects, making it a far more compelling criminal
case.
The overwhelming majority of environmental prosecutions, however, do
not involve readily provable environmental harm, let alone the catastrophic
harm present in the Gulf oil spill. Prosecutors in environmental crime trials
often seek to exclude evidence that the violations did not cause environ-
mental harm. They argue that environmental harm is not an element that
must be proven and that its absence is not a defense to liability for environ-
mental crime. The legal basis for the government's position is sound; 2 15 only
knowing endangerment charges focus on harm, and they address instances
where violations create an imminent risk of death or serious bodily injury,
not environmental harm.216 But the strategic reason that prosecutors seek to
exclude evidence of harm is because there often is no evidence of harm,
which could lead to jury nullification, or because the harm question is too
esoteric and would produce a distracting and irrelevant expert debate about
what constitutes environmental harm. 17
In a certain sense, the harm that flows from traditional environmental
cases exists in the context of aggregate effects: the sum total of all unlawful
pollution is harmful, so prosecution of intentional acts of pollution is neces-
sary to deter unlawful pollution even if the harm in a particular case is not
significant (or is nonexistent). In other environmental prosecutions, the harm
may be to the regulatory system, which cannot function properly if regula-
213. See, e.g., Emery Worldwide Airlines, Inc., No. 3:03-CR-00113 (S.D. Ohio 2003); Motiva
Enterprises, LLC, No. 1:05-CR-00021 (D. Del. 2005).
214. Uhlmann, supra note 113, at 1247.
215. See Susan F. Mandiberg, Locating the Environmental Harm in Envirnmental Crimes,
2009 UTAH L. REV. 1177, 1178 (2009) ("[Flew [environmental crimes] contain a 'result' element,
and none require[] the government to prove the result of environmental harm.").
216. See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 § 3008(e), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928(e) (2006) (providing enhanced penalties for RCRA violations when the defendant knows "he
thereby places another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury"). As Susan
Mandiberg notes, endangerment provisions appear to address environmental harm but they may also
apply where harm to the environment is merely risked. Mandiberg, supra note 215, at 1192.
217. Uhlmann, supra note 113, at 1246 n.114; see also Mandiberg, supra note 215, at 1201-
03 (noting the difficulty of defining environmental harm, assessing the extent of environmental
damage, and resolving potential "'battle[s] of the experts'").
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tors do not have truthful information about pollution.218 Or the harm may
accrue to competitors, who spend substantial funds on environmental com-
pliance and should not be placed at a competitive disadvantage with
companies who flout their environmental obligations. 2'9 But rarely does the
harm in environmental cases approach the harm that resulted from the Gulf
oil spill, which underscores the degree to which the Gulf oil spill will be
different than most other environmental prosecutions.220
IV. RECONCILING THE GULF OIL SPILL CASE WITH THE ROLE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE
PURPOSES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
I have asserted throughout this Article that the Gulf oil spill will result in
a criminal prosecution, which will be the most significant environmental
criminal case ever prosecuted and will produce the largest fines ever im-
posed for any corporate crime in the United States. I also have claimed that
the Gulf oil spill will be an anomalous environmental prosecution that may
skew public perceptions of environmental crime. Of course, these are pre-
dictions, not statements of fact: the Justice Department has confirmed the
existence of a criminal investigation, but it has not yet announced whether
any of the companies or individuals involved will be charged with crimes.
I nonetheless contend that the decision whether to prosecute was essen-
tially made when BP failed to contain the spill and when it began to exact
such a terrible toll on the Gulf and the communities along its shores. I say
"essentially" because the government is predisposed to prosecute in cases
involving significant harm, if a viable legal theory supports the charges. As
discussed in Part II, such a theory is readily available in oil spill cases,
where proof requirements are minimal. As a result, while final decisions
may not have been made about which charges to bring and whether individ-
ual defendants should be prosecuted (which may generate debate within the
Department), it is a foregone conclusion that there will be a criminal prose-
cution based on the Gulf oil spill.
Yet the likelihood of criminal charges does not resolve the normative
question of whether criminal charges in the Gulf oil spill are an appropriate
use of criminal sanctions under the environmental laws and under the criminal
218. Uhlmann, supra note 113, at 1249 (stating that fair and effective administration of the
environmental laws cannot happen without complete and accurate information from the regulatory
community).
219. Id. (stating that companies that operate outside the regulatory system should not be al-
lowed to have a competitive advantage over companies that make the necessary financial
commitment to compliance).
220. To the extent that the public perceives the Gulf oil spill as epitomizing environmental
crime, it may become more difficult to prosecute other environmental crimes. If judges and juries
come to expect a correlation between environmental crime and environmental harm, prosecution
could be more difficult in cases where there is no evidence of readily provable environmental harm.
On the other hand, if the Gulf oil spill were not prosecuted, defense attorneys might argue that other
environmental crimes should not be prosecuted because the harm was worse in the Gulf oil spill.
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law more generally. Even if criminal charges are justified, the ways that the
Gulf oil spill case is anomalous may raise issues for a theoretical account of
criminal enforcement under the environmental laws. Will charges based on
ordinary negligence blur the lines between criminal and civil enforcement?
Does a prosecution predicated on harm undermine the appropriate focus on
culpable conduct?
This Part considers the Gulf oil spill in the broader context of the role of
criminal enforcement under the environmental laws and criminal law theory.
I argue that criminal prosecution will have deterrent value that civil penal-
ties alone would not, and will express societal condemnation of the Gulf oil
spill in ways that civil enforcement cannot-but that criminal enforcement
is not a substitute for more effective regulation of offshore drilling. I also
suggest that Congress may want to reconsider the ordinary-negligence stan-
dard under the Clean Water Act, and caution that incidents with significant
environmental harm can result in opportunistic prosecutions, although the
findings of the presidential commission suggest that result will not occur
here.
A. Deterrence and the Role of Societal Condemnation
Congress enacted the environmental laws to protect public health and
the environment from the harmful effects of pollution.221 Congress provided
a range of enforcement options, including criminal, civil, and administrative
penalties, to promote compliance with the laws and to deter violations that
222
would undermine pollution control efforts. Criminal penalties, including
the possibility of imprisonment for individual defendants, were included
because Congress recognized that some violators would not be deterred by
civil or administrative penalties, and that some violations would be so egre-
gious that civil or administrative penalties would provide insufficient
punishment.223 From this perspective, criminal prosecution of environmental
violations is perhaps best justified by deterrence theory, inasmuch as it
serves utilitarian concerns (i.e., the prevention of harm to public health and
the environment) without regard to whether the underlying conduct would
be morally wrongful absent a statutory prohibition.
By acknowledging the primary role that deterrence theory plays in
criminal enforcement of the environmental laws, I do not suggest that envi-
221. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006) ("The objective of this
chapter is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters."); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 § 1003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a) ("The
objectives of this chapter are to promote the protection of health and the environment . . . ."); Clean
Air Act § 101(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b) (2006) (including as a goal the "protect[ion] and en-
hance[ment] [of air] quality ... so as to promote the public health and welfare").
222. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)-(c) (authorizing administrative, civil, or criminal enforce-
ment for violations of the Clean Water Act).
223. See Raymond W. Mushal, Up from the Sewers: A Perspective on the Evolution of the
Federal Environmental Crimes Program, 2009 UTAH L. REv. 1103, 1105 n.8 (2009) (referring to
criminal enforcement as a "gorilla in the closet").
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ronmental crimes lack moral content. I have argued previously that ecologi-
cal concerns have altered historical notions about the wrongfulness of
224pollution. Environmental crimes such as knowing endangerment or con-
tamination of public drinking water supplies are moral offenses that also
warrant criminal sanction under a retributive theory of the criminal law.225
Under retributive theory, we punish criminal wrongdoing because the con-
duct is inherently wrongful and deserves punishment, regardless of whether
the punishment will deter future harm or serve other utilitarian goals. 226 Al-
though punishment for environmental crimes such as recordkeeping
violations might be hard to justify under a retributive theory, it is possible to
justify criminal sanctions for some environmental violations (and perhaps
221
many) under both deterrence and retributive theories of the criminal law.
There is a good argument that the Gulf oil spill is the type of environ-
mental violation that warrants punishment under both deterrence and
retributive theories. The negligence that caused the Gulf oil spill can be seen
as morally culpable, because the failure to take reasonable care in an off-
shore drilling context puts lives and the environment at risk. Indeed, the
potential for harm was realized dramatically, beginning with the loss of life
on the Deepwater Horizon and continuing with the ecological harm to the
Gulf and the economic hardship to the communities along the Gulf shores.
On this account, BP, Transocean, and Halliburton deserve to be punished for
their negligence, which is a retributive justification.
Yet, while negligence that causes terrible harm may have moral content,
retributive theorists have long rejected negligence as a basis for imposing
criminal liability. They argue that crimes predicated on negligence do not
have sufficient moral culpability to warrant criminal sanction, because de-
fendants in negligence cases did not realize that their conduct could cause
harm.228 A retributive analysis of the Gulf oil spill, at least in its classic for-
229
mulation, would only impose criminal sanctions if there were evidence
224. Uhlmann, supra note 113, at 1230.
225. See R.A. Duff, Towards a Theory of Criminal Law?, 84 PROc. ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y
SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME 1, 23-24 (2010) (including "various kinds of pollution" in a listing of
"wrongs of endangerment" that "we have good reason to criminalize").
226. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. MOORE, The moral worth of retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY,
CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179, 179 (Ferdinand
Schoeman ed., 1987) ("Retributivism is the view that punishment is justified by the moral culpabil-
ity of those who receive it. A retributivist punishes because, and only because, the offender deserves
it.").
227. The Model Penal Code has been described as an effort to incorporate the strengths of a
utilitarian theory, a deterrence theory, and a retributive theory. See Gerald Leonard, Towards a Legal
History of American Criminal Theory: Culture and Doctrine from Blackstone to the Model Penal
Code, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 691, 815-17 (2003).
228. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Negligence, Mens Rea, and Criminal Responsibility, in OXFORD
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 29, 44-45 (A. G. Guest ed., 1961), reprinted in H.L.A. HART, PUNISH-
MENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 136, 152 (2d ed. 2008); see also
John L. Diamond, The Myth of Morality and Fault in Criminal Law Doctrine, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
111, 120-27 (1996).
229. Whether we should rethink the moral content of corporate negligence in the environ-
mental context is a question that may warrant further inquiry but is beyond the scope of this Article.
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that the companies knew that there was a risk of a blowout and its attendant
harm, which is more akin to recklessness (a higher mental-state standard
that includes disregarding known risks).
Criminal prosecution of the Gulf oil spill based on negligence therefore
may fit more readily within a deterrence theory of the criminal law. The ar-
gument for criminal prosecution rests to a significant degree on the desire to
ensure that a similar environmental tragedy does not occur again. Offshore
drilling is inherently dangerous,23 with potentially catastrophic public health
and environmental consequences if it is not conducted properly. We want
companies engaged in offshore drilling to make environmental protection
and worker safety a priority. They must structure their management systems
to ensure that exploration activities are conducted without causing harm.
Criminal prosecution would be intended to make certain that BP, Trans-
ocean, and Halliburton engage in more careful drilling in the future (specific
deterrence) and to promote better safety practices throughout the drilling
industry (general deterrence).
In terms of specific deterrence, criminal prosecution should lead to sig-
nificant changes in how BP, Transocean, and Halliburton conduct drilling
operations, which is what occurred within Exxon after the Exxon Valdez
prosecution.23' In addition to the deterrent effect of record fines, criminal
sentences are likely to include corporate compliance programs. If imple-
mented properly, corporate compliance programs will require BP,
Transocean, and Halliburton to make environmental protection and worker
safety a much greater priority. While there are no guarantees that specific
deterrence will occur-BP apparently was not deterred by its prior criminal
convictions, which also required corporate compliance programs-it is
unlikely that any company could endure the liabilities that would result from
a second catastrophic spill.
From a general deterrence perspective, criminal prosecution should
promote safer drilling by making the costs of risky behavior prohibitive for
most companies-and crippling for even enormously profitable companies
like BP. In addition, by also prosecuting Transocean and Halliburton, the
government will make clear that drilling contractors share responsibility for
environmentally sound practices and no longer can defer to the well owner
or lessee. Promoting a more rigorous compliance culture among all the
companies involved in offshore drilling will serve the broader deterrent goal
of preventing future spills.
Of course, it could be argued that criminal prosecution is not needed to
send the message that oil companies and drilling contractors do not want to
be held responsible for a tragedy like the Gulf oil spill. BP, Transocean,
230. See NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 91.
231. See The Valdez Oil Spill, ExXONMOBIL, http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/about
issuesvaldez.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2011) ("In the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez accident,
ExxonMobil redoubled its long-time commitment to safeguard the environment, employees and
operating communities .... In the event a spill occurs, we also have improved our response
capability.").
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Anadarko, and Mitsui face multi-billion-dollar civil penalties for their roles
in the spill232 (in addition to the more than ten billion dollars that BP has
paid for well control and cleanup and the twenty billion dollars that BP set
233
aside to compensate victims and pay natural resource damage claims).
Multi-billion-dollar civil penalties should be an incentive for companies
involved in offshore drilling to ensure that they do not suffer a similar fate.
Civil penalties have a deterrent effect, and the additional deterrence of
criminal penalties could be cumulative.
Nonetheless, criminal prosecution may do more than civil penalties
alone to bring about changes in how oil companies and drilling contractors
conduct offshore drilling. First, the reach of the criminal law is broader, ex-
tending to all persons who negligently discharge oil in violation of the Clean
Water Act.234 Civil penalties apply only to owners, operators, or persons in
charge of the offshore facility or vessel,23 a limitation that may explain why
Halliburton was not named in the civil suit filed by the Justice Department
in December 2010. Second, it is unlikely that criminal penalties will be
shifted from contractors to the well owner by the broad indemnification
agreements that are common in the offshore drilling industry. Transocean
and Halliburton had indemnification agreements with BP that required re-
imbursement of all costs (including penalties) incurred as a result of a well
blowout. Indemnification agreements may be unenforceable in the crimi-
nal context, however, since indemnification undermines the punitive nature
of criminal sentencing. Taken together, the broader reach of the criminal law
and the likely absence of indemnification for criminal fines would do more
to ensure that well owners and drilling contractors share responsibility for
environmentally sound practices than the imposition of civil penalties alone.
Criminal prosecution may also permit sanctions that may not be avail-
able in civil cases, which will increase its deterrent value. First, criminal
conviction carries the possibility of suspension or debarment from govern-
ment contracts until the convicted corporation corrects the condition giving
232. The Clean Water Act provides for civil fines up to $1,100 per barrel-nearly $5 billion-
and up to $4,300 per barrel-possibly as much as $20 billion-for any companies that were grossly
negligent. Adjustment of Civil Monetary Penalties for Inflation, 69 Fed. Reg. 7124, 7125 tbl.1 (Feb.
13, 2004).
233. Graeme Wearden, BP oil spill costs to hit $40 bn, GUARDIAN, Nov. 2, 2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/nov/02/bp-oil-spill-costs-40-billion-dollars; see also Julia
werdigier, BPs Profit Declines On Oil Spill Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, at B3.
234. Clean Water Act § 309(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (2006) ("[alny person who ...
negligently violates section . . . 1321(b)(3)").
235. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(A) ("[a]ny person who is the owner, operator or person in
charge of any vessel ... or offshore facility from which oil .. . is discharged in violation of para-
graph (3)" (emphasis added)).
236. Roger Parloff, BP is not alone in Gulf exposure, CNNMONEY.COM (June 11, 2010, 12:10
PM). http://money.cnn.com/2010/06/11/news/companies/Parloff_1egalBP.fortune/index.htm ("Both
Halliburton . . . and Transocean . .. have claimed in SEC filings or in congressional testimony that
they have broad indemnification agreements with BP that will leave BP holding the bag for virtually
all the spill costs.. . .").
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rise to the violation. 237 Although there is some question about whether the
government would debar a company as large as BP238-and, even if they
were debarred, the suspension would last only until BP came into
compliance-loss of government contracts is a significant sanction in
criminal cases. Second, corporate criminal defendants must pay full restitu-
tion to victims. In civil cases, economic damages fall within the seventy-
five-million-dollar damage cap set by the Oil Pollution Act and only extend
to the responsible parties, who, in the case of the Macondo well, would be
the lessees (BP, Anadarko, and Mitsui).239 The Justice Department included
allegations of gross negligence, willful misconduct, and violation of federal
safety regulations in its civil complaint, which, if proven, would remove the
liability limits of the Oil Pollution Act. 240 But the government would only
need to prove ordinary negligence to trigger criminal restitution (albeit
under a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard as opposed to a preponderance-
of-the-evidence standard). BP has indicated that it will not seek the protec-
tion of the liability cap, but none of the other companies involved in the spill
have agreed to waive the liability cap and to pay any cleanup costs or
damages.
Criminal prosecution also is warranted because of what it communicates
about the negligent conduct that made the Gulf oil spill possible. Criminal
sanction and punishment have an expressive dimension that reflects our so-
cietal views of the underlying conduct. 24 We make clear that conduct is
outside the bounds of acceptable behavior when we label it criminal. By
criminally prosecuting BP, Transocean, and Halliburton, we condemn the
lax corporate management that allowed such a terrible tragedy to occur and
the ways in which the companies took risks and deviated from standard in-
dustry practices.
Scholars disagree about whether the expressive function of punishment
represents an alternative broad-based theory of the criminal law or merely
242
reinforces the underlying deterrence or retribution. But whether viewed as
237. 33 U.S.C. § 1368(a) (prohibiting federal contracting with any person convicted under the
Clean Water Act "until the [EPA] Administrator certifies that the condition giving rise to such con-
viction has been corrected").
238. Ron Nixon, Size Protects Government Contractors That Stray, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,
2010, at A12.
239. See Oil Pollution Act § 1004(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3) (2006) (seventy-five-million-
dollar liability limit); 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32)(C) (definition of responsible party for offshore facili-
ties).
240. See id. § 2704(c)(1)(A) (exception to limits on liability if incident proximately caused by
gross negligence, willful misconduct, or violation of a federal safety regulation or operating regula-
tion by a responsible party).
241. See Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONisT 397 (1965),
reprinted in JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY
95, 95-118 (1970).
242. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 591,
595-97 (1996). For example, Kahan argues that expressive theory accounts for the public rejection
of alternative sanctions, which neither a retributive theory nor a deterrence theory can otherwise
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a standalone theory or as a corollary to deterrence or retribution theory,
there is no question that criminal prosecution has a stigmatizing effect that
civil enforcement does not. "Criminal law is ultimately different from tort
and other civil law, not because it demands more culpability but because of
the condemnation it imposes on its transgressors."243 Indeed, civil violations
can be resolved without any admission of liability; criminal violations re-
quire a defendant to admit culpability (in this case negligence), a public
acknowledgement of guilt and acceptance of responsibility that increases the
stigma associated with a criminal conviction.2
Conversely, if the Justice Department declines criminal prosecution of
the Gulf oil spill, it would diminish the seriousness of the negligence that
caused the spill. As Dan Kahan explains, "when society deliberately fore-
goes answering the wrongdoer through punishment, it risks being
perceived as endorsing [the misconduct] . .. ."245 The mixed message of a
decision not to prosecute would be even greater here because the president
of the United States announced that there was a criminal investigation of the
Gulf oil spill. The attorney general has continued to emphasize the criminal
investigation in his public comments, most recently when he announced the
filing of the civil suit based on the spill at a press conference with the ad-
ministrator of the EPA. As in other contexts where sanctions are threatened
but not imposed, the wrong message would be sent, and deterrent value
would be lost, without a criminal prosecution.
At the same time, there are limits to the deterrent value of a criminal
prosecution. To prevent future oil spills, the government must prohibit the
conduct that caused the Gulf oil spill and take strong enforcement action
against companies that violate drilling rules. The government already re-
quires companies to inspect and maintain equipment such as blowout
preventers; it should develop comparable regulatory requirements under the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to govern the circulation of drilling mud,
cement seals, negative pressure readings, and other procedures that were not
conducted properly in the days and hours before the blowout.246
It is unlikely BP, Transocean, and Halliburton would face criminal
prosecution but for the tragic harms caused by the Gulf oil spill. If the same
conduct had occurred, but the blowout preventer prevented a discharge, it is
unlikely that anyone outside the government and the drilling industry would
explain. Id. at 605-30. Kahan notes, however, that many scholars either disregard expressive theory
entirely or view it as a restatement of retributive or deterrent accounts. Id. at 595-97.
243. John L. Diamond, The Crisis in the Ideology of Crime, 31 IND. L. REV. 291, 311 (1998).
Notably, Diamond also expressed concern that "what is criminally wrong and right must be some-
thing more than what is merely civilly wrong and right." Id. at 309.
244. But see V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109
HARv. L. REV. 1477, 1508-09 (1996) (questioning whether corporate reputational loss from crimi-
nal penalties is greater than when comparable civil penalties are imposed).
245. Kahan, supra note 242, at 598.
246. The presidential commission on the Gulf oil spill reached a similar conclusion, arguing
that another spill was "inevitable" absent both improved industry practices and enhanced regulation.
John M. Broder, Tougher Rules Urged For Offshore Drilling, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 12, 2011, at A12.
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have known about the near miss. If the same conduct had transpired but
there were no worker deaths, and the spill was limited to a few hundred bar-
rels of oil, BP would have faced only civil or administrative penalties.
Indeed, Transocean experienced a similar incident on one of its rigs in the
North Sea-where drilling laws are more rigorous-but only three barrels
of oil were discharged and no criminal charges have been brought for its
negligence. 24 In the United States, there were twenty-eight major drilling-
related spills, natural-gas releases, or well-control incidents in the Gulf of
Mexico during 2009, including a loss of well control and an explosion in
April that did not result in a major spill only because the blowout preventer
worked. 4 No criminal charges were filed.
Criminal law theorists caution that we undermine deterrent effects when
we prosecute only if harm results from negligent or reckless conduct.249 The
defendants in negligence or recklessness cases do not intend to cause harm;
rather, they fail to apprehend the risk of harm or disregard known risks be-
cause they do not believe the harm will materialize.2o Under this argument,
what should be deterred is the conduct that causes the harm, rather than
25!
simply the harm. If the sanction only occurs when the harm occurs, the
deterrent effect will diminish as the risk of harm diminishes or as the com-
252pany involved becomes less cognizant of the risk. A similar pathology
may have occurred before the blowout of the Macondo well-rig workers
and their supervisors tragically underestimated the risks of their conduct-
and could remain going forward.
Offshore drilling is an inherently risky business, but never before in over
forty years of drilling on the Gulf had there been a catastrophe like the Gulf
oil spill. Even after the Gulf oil spill, drilling companies may be discounting
the risk that a similar tragedy will happen again. A criminal prosecution
would help reduce this complacency by increasing the costs of an oil spill
and by expressing societal condemnation in ways that civil sanctions alone
cannot. We should recognize, however, that a more robust regulatory scheme
with appropriate criminal and civil enforcement for violations may do more
to deter risky behavior than a record-breaking criminal prosecution in the
rare case where a blowout occurs with catastrophic harm.
247. Tom Bergin, Shell Urges U.S. to adopt North Sea drilling rules, REUTERS, Oct. 14, 2010,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/14/us-shell-safety-idUSTRE69D3YV20101014;
Robbie Brown, Another rig's close call altered rules, papers say, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 17, 2010, at
Al9.
248. See Russell Gold & Ben Casselman, Far Offshore, a Rash of Close Calls, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 9, 2010, at Al.
249. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Foreword: The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679 (1994); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique
of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 1539-44
(1974).
250. See Schulhofer, supra note 249, at 1539-41.
251. See Ronald J. Allen, Retribution in a Modem Penal Law: The Principle of Aggravated
Harm, 25 BUFF. L. REv 1, 19 (1975).
252. Schulhofer, supra note 249, at 1542.
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B. What Makes Environmental Violations Criminal and the Problem
of Clean Water Act Negligence Cases
The theoretical challenge presented by criminal enforcement under the
environmental laws is the difficulty of articulating a principled account
about which violations of the environmental laws are criminal. The envi-
ronmental laws make only limited distinctions between what violations are
criminal and what are civil or administrative violations."' In most instances,
the conduct requirement for criminal prosecution is no different than for
civil enforcement. The only additional proof required in a criminal case is
that the defendant must have acted with the requisite mental state, which for
most environmental crimes means proof that the defendant acted "know-
ingly" when she committed a prohibited act.254
The Supreme Court has never addressed what it means to act knowingly
under the environmental laws, but the courts of appeals have uniformly held
that "knowingly" requires proof that the defendant had knowledge of the
facts that constitute the violation; knowledge of the law is not required.
For example, in a hazardous waste disposal case, courts have required the
government to show that the defendant knew that (1) the material involved
was waste; (2) the waste had the substantial potential to be harmful to public
health or the environment; and (3) the waste was disposed. Courts have not
required the government to show that the defendant knew the waste met the
legal definition of "hazardous waste" or that disposal required a permit. In
so ruling, courts have invoked the familiar maxim that "ignorance of the law
is no defense" and have rejected the argument that knowledge of illegality
should be required in areas of regulatory complexity such as environmental
law.256
The requirement of showing only knowledge of the facts is the mental-
state standard for most federal crimes.25 There may be some merit, how-
ever, to suggestions that knowledge of the facts does not distinguish
criminal violations from civil violations under the environmental laws.
Many violations of the environmental laws occur with knowledge of the
253. Uhlmann, supra note 113, at 1242.
254. See id. at 1235-39.
255. See, e.g., United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 537-40 (2d Cir. 1995) (Clean Water
Act); United States v. Buckley, 934 F.2d 84, 88-89 (6th Cir. 1991) (Clean Air Act and CERCLA);
United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 1989) (Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act of 1976). But see United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 669 (3d Cir.
1984) (requiring knowledge that a permit was required in criminal prosecution for Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act hazardous waste violations).
256. By requiring knowledge of the facts, rather than knowledge of illegality, courts have
imposed a duty on corporations to know their obligations under the environmental laws and have
thus avoided the perverse incentives that might arise if ignorance of those obligations provided a
defense in criminal prosecutions under the environmental laws.
257. See Uhlmann, supra note 113, at 1235-39. The most notable exceptions are criminal tax
violations.
258. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REv. 193, 217 (1991).
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facts, regardless of whether they result in criminal or civil enforcement. For
example, if a company is unable to control its discharges within permit lim-
its, and if it monitors its discharges as required, the company "knows" that
its discharges are at elevated levels. If the company honestly reports the ele-
vated discharges, it is unlikely to face criminal prosecution, unless the
discharges continue for such a long period of time that the government con-
cludes the company is not making a good faith effort to correct the
259
violations. In contrast, if the company attempted to cover up the discharge
violations through false statements, criminal prosecution would occur (if the
concealment scheme were discovered). The rationale for criminally prose-
cuting the company that attempts to hide its violations should be clear. One
company is honestly participating in the self-reporting system established
by the environmental laws, while the other is using that same system to
cheat and hide its violations. Both companies, however, have knowingly
violated the underlying statutory and regulatory provisions that limit lawful
discharges.
If it can be difficult to distinguish criminal and civil cases based on a
"knowingly" standard, the problem necessarily becomes worse if criminal
prosecution occurs based on a lesser standard such as ordinary negligence,
as is possible in misdemeanor cases under the Clean Water Act." Most dis-
charges that do not occur knowingly involve at least some human error and
therefore could support negligence charges. Even cases that would appear to
satisfy only a strict-liability standard-for example, a discharge that oc-
curred during a hurricane-could involve negligence if the defendant failed
to take adequate steps to prevent the discharge. The availability of negli-
gence charges thus excludes only a very small category of Clean Water Act
violations, if any, from possible criminal enforcement.
The likely use of negligence charges in the Gulf oil spill could highlight
the fact that the Clean Water Act makes little distinction between criminal
and civil violations. Moreover, it would demonstrate how the ordinary-
negligence standard allows prosecutors to seek criminal charges in Clean
Water Act cases based on an after-the-fact analysis of the reasonableness of
a defendant's actions-an analysis that may not be moored to any governing
regulatory standard. In the deepwater drilling context, if a discharge of oil
occurs and causes a sheen on the water, the act requirement for criminal
prosecution is met. Criminal liability then attaches if the defendant's con-
duct fails the reasonable person test for negligence, in which the relevant
focus will be the drilling activity. Yet the Clean Water Act tells us nothing
about what constitutes improper drilling activity, except that drilling cannot
result in a prohibited discharge of oil.
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act could provide a normative
framework to evaluate whether negligent conduct caused the Gulf oil spill.
259. See Uhlmann, supra note 113, at 1252.
260. See id. at 1248-49.
261. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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The Justice Department's civil complaint alleges violation of regulations
promulgated under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. Similarly, prose-
cutors may claim that BP, Transocean, and Halliburton were negligent
because their conduct violated drilling regulations. Their ability to do so,
however, may be hampered by the general language of the drilling regula-
tions and the extent to which the alleged violations may have been
sanctioned by MMS officials.
As a result, the decision whether to seek criminal charges for the Gulf
oil spill-and the determination of guilt once the case reaches court-may
depend upon expert opinions about best practices for activities such as the
circulation of drilling mud, the testing of cement seals, and the inspection of
blowout preventers, juxtaposed with what regulatory officials at MMS stated
were acceptable practices for the Macondo well. Of course, our legal system
frequently makes determinations about reasonable care based on expert
opinions, and negligence is a basis for imposing criminal liability in cases
such as vehicular homicide. In vehicular homicide cases, however, negli-
gence is predicated on a defendant engaging in underlying conduct that is
illegal, such as driving while impaired or driving at excessive speeds, and
often involves knowledge of risk that is not required under the Clean Water
262Act. In the Gulf oil spill, absent proof that drilling regulations were vio-
lated, the underlying conduct may have been legal or at least condoned by
regulators. Criminal responsibility thus will be based on the kind of after-
the-fact determination of whether the defendants acted with reasonable care
263
normally associated with tort cases.
A heightened criminal negligence or recklessness standard might pro-
vide a more meaningful basis for imposing criminal liability under the
Clean Water Act.64 Criminal negligence imposes liability only when a de-
fendant's conduct involves a substantial deviation from standards of
265
reasonable care, which distinguishes criminal liability from tort liability.
Recklessness adds the requirement that a defendant be aware of the risk
266
associated with her conduct, which adds a mental state element more
akin to what is required in criminal cases. Use of either a criminal negli-
gence standard or a recklessness standard would also provide a more logical
graduated penalty scheme under the Clean Water Act. The Act currently
262. See, e.g., People v. Decina, 138 N.E.2d 799, 803 (N.Y. 1956).
263. See generally Susan J. LaBine & Gary LaBine, Determinations of Negligence and the
Hindsight Bias, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 501 (1996); Philip G. Peters, Jr., Hindsight Bias and Tort
Liability: Avoiding Premature Conclusions, 31 Aiuz. ST. L. 1277 (1999); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A
Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. Cm. L. REV. 571 (1998) (exploring
hindsight bias and discussing how laws, such as tort rules, address it).
264. In United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1999), the defendant argued that a
criminal negligence standard should be required under the Clean Water Act, but his position was
rejected by the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 1120-21.
265. Under the Model Penal Code, a person acts with criminal negligence when she "should
be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that . . . will result from [her] conduct." MODEL PE-
NAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (1962).
266. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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alternates between civil and criminal penalties as the violations become
more egregious. Discharges that occur without fault are strict liability civil
violations; negligent discharges are misdemeanors; grossly negligent dis-
charges carry heightened civil penalties; and knowing discharges are
felonies. 267 A more rational penalty scheme might reserve criminal penalties
for knowing or reckless discharges-or at least criminal negligence-while
providing graduated civil penalties depending upon whether the defendant's
conduct involved ordinary negligence or strict liability.
The Gulf oil spill case may not involve the theoretical problems raised
by Clean Water Act negligence charges if there is evidence that BP, Trans-
ocean, and Halliburton intentionally departed from industry norms or
ignored known risks-in other words, if their conduct involved criminal
negligence or recklessness. Even without evidence of criminal negligence or
recklessness, there may be less concern about imposing criminal liability
under an ordinary negligence standard in a case like the Gulf oil spill where
the harm is so great. Indeed, it could be argued that cases involving signifi-
cant harm, much like homicide cases, should allow for criminal prosecution
based on lower mental-state standards. As currently formulated, however,
the Clean Water Act makes no such distinctions, so any discharge that re-
sults from negligence can give rise to criminal liability. Congress therefore
should consider limiting criminal liability for ordinary negligence to cases
of endangerment (as under the Clean Air Act) or cases that involve substan-
tial harm to the environment (like the Gulf oil spill), and should otherwise
require at least criminal negligence or recklessness for criminal prosecution.
C. Environmental Harm and Opportunistic Prosecution
The limited statutory guidance about which environmental violations are
criminal increases the degree to which environmental law relies on the
sound exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Scholars have debated whether
Congress delegated too much authority to prosecutors to determine when
environmental violations are criminal.268 The significance of that debate-
and our ability to answer the normative question about what makes envi-
ronmental violations criminal-depends upon whether we can identify the
discretionary factors that should trigger criminal enforcement. I have
suggested that "criminal prosecution should be reserved for cases involving
(1) significant harm or risk of harm to the environment or public health,
(2) deceptive or misleading conduct, (3) [facilities that] operate outside the
267. See Clean Water Act § 311(b)(7)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(A) (2006) (strict liability
civil penalties); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (negligent misdemeanor criminal penalties); id.
§ 1321(b)(7)(D) (gross negligence civil penalties); id. § 1319(c)(2) (knowing felony criminal penal-
ties).
268. Compare Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of
Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407, 2487 (1995) (ex-
pressing concern about the amount of discretion delegated to prosecutors), with Kathleen F. Brickey,
The Rhetoric of Environmental Crime: Culpability, Discretion, and Structural Reform, 84 IowA L.
REV. 115, 127-29 (1998) (arguing that broad discretion is a fundamental aspect of all criminal en-
forcement programs).
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environmental regulatory system, or (4) significant and repetitive violations
of environmental laws."269 Focusing criminal enforcement efforts on cases
involving these factors would not narrow the statutory definition of envi-
ronmental crime, but it could mitigate concerns about whether prosecutors
have too much discretion.
Initially, the Gulf oil spill does not appear to raise any issues under a
theoretical construct that includes significant harm or risk of harm to the
environment or public health as one of the criteria that make environmental
violations criminal.270 The spill produced all of the harms that the environ-
mental laws seek to prevent: deaths, ecological devastation, and economic
losses. The only past violation involving anything approaching comparable
harm was the Exxon Valdez oil spill, which was a smaller discharge, resulted
in no deaths, and caused fewer economic damages.
Nor is the emphasis on harm simply a theoretical construct. The EPA
emphasizes cases involving significant harm in its policy regarding the exer-
cise of investigative discretion.21 The Justice Department focuses on harm
in its policy governing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in cases of
272
corporate misconduct. The federal sentencing guidelines proscribe longer
sentences in cases that result in significant harm to the environment or pub-
273lic health. Even critics of environmental criminal enforcement concede
that cases involving harm or risk of harm may be appropriate for criminal
274prosecution. When an environmental "violation puts the environment or
public health at risk," environmental protection is compromised and "there
275
are significant societal costs" that may warrant sanctions.
269. Uhlmann, supra note 113, at 1226, 1246-52.
270. As noted in Part III, the Gulf oil spill could also involve false statements or concealment
if evidence shows that corporate officials misled MMS about conditions at the well or the amount of
oil gushing from the well. False statements and obstruction of justice fall well within the heartland
of environmental criminal prosecution. For the purposes of this discussion, however, our focus is on
the spill itself, without regard to whether any violations were exacerbated by false or misleading
conduct.
271. See Memorandum from Earl E. Devaney, Dir., Office of Criminal Enforcement, Envtl.
Prot. Agency, to all EPA Employees Working in or in Support of the Criminal Enforcement
Program (Jan. 12, 1994), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/criminall
exercise.pdf.
272. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 155, at tit. 9, ch. 28. The Justice Department's
corporate prosecution policy lists environmental crimes as an example of crime that may raise a
substantial risk of harm to the public and may therefore warrant criminal prosecution. Id. at tit. 9,
ch. 28.200(B). The policy also identifies "the nature and seriousness of the offense, including the
risk of harm to the public," as the first factor to be considered in determining whether to pursue
criminal charges. Id. at tit. 9, ch. 28.300.
273. Under Section 2Q1.2(b)(1)(A) of the federal sentencing guidelines, the recommended
sentence is increased if there is a discharge into the environment, and the amount of the increase is
adjusted upward or downward depending partly upon the harm that occurs. U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Q1.2 cmt. 5 (2010). The guidelines also call for a longer sentence if the
violation results in substantial cleanup costs. Id. § 2Ql.2(b)(3).
274. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 258, at 217 (identifying knowing commissions of environ-
mental crimes such as willful endangerment as "serious offenses that do not merit leniency").
275. See Uhlmann, supra note 113, at 1247.
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The danger in cases involving environmental harm or public health ef-
fects, however, is not that criminal prosecution cannot be justified as a
reasonable exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The concern is that the egre-
giousness of the harm will divert attention from the culpability of the
underlying conduct. Harm cases have the potential to create a tautology:
because there was significant harm, criminal prosecution will occur regard-
less of whether the conduct involved serious violations or whether there was
a substantial causal link between any violations and the resulting harm.
Harm cases can easily become criminal prosecutions in search of a theory of
liability that, no matter how attenuated, will provide a legal basis for prose-
cuting under circumstances in which few will protest. Our concern and
anger over environmental harm, particularly when accompanied by injury or
death, can displace sober analysis of whether the defendant engaged in con-
duct that warrants criminal sanction. When that occurs, the risk is that the
government will prosecute opportunistically-because it can justify charges
and may prevail despite the thinness of its case-thus undermining princi-
ples of fairness and blurring the lines between criminal and civil
violations.276
The potential for opportunistic criminal prosecution is great in a case
like the Gulf oil spill. The Exxon Valdez prosecution provides precedent.
The harm could not be much worse. The companies involved have criminal
histories (BP), questionable safety records (Transocean), and poor public
images (Halliburton). Fighting criminal charges would prolong a public re-
lations nightmare for the companies and would create destabilizing
uncertainty about the extent of their financial liabilities. While public senti-
ment may be less charged than it was when oil was still gushing into the
Gulf, the government could be criticized for being too lenient or too pro-
business if the result is anything less than felony prosecution of the
217
corporate defendants and jail time for corporate executives.
Moreover, we tend to assume when a tragedy like the Gulf oil spill oc-
curs that someone must be at fault and should be held accountable. From
that assumption, it may not be a large leap to the conclusion that fault and
accountability mean criminal culpability, particularly when criminal liability
can be imposed based on a minimal showing of ordinary negligence. We
view the harm as an intolerable violation of societal norms that justifies
criminal sanction if, with the benefit of hindsight, we can find fault in the
underlying conduct, which is not difficult in complex engineering activities
like offshore drilling.
Of course, the risk of opportunistic prosecution in harm cases does not
mean that the Gulf oil spill will result in a problematic criminal prosecution.
BP, Transocean, and Halliburton engaged in conduct that made a catastro-
phic blowout possible, which would be objectionable even if no spill had
occurred. As a result, criminal prosecution of the Gulf oil spill will be based
276. Id. at 1247-48.
277. Uhlmann, Prosecuting Crimes Against the Earth, supra note 114.
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on a combination of culpable conduct and resulting harm, which involves an
appropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The broader normative
point, however, is that the government should be able to identify why the
conduct is culpable without regard to the resulting harm.278 Except under
strict liability schemes,27 9 conduct is not culpable simply because harm oc-
curs. When we prosecute based on harm alone, without also requiring
culpable conduct that warrants criminal sanction, we further collapse the
distinction between criminal and civil violations-and between crimes and
torts.
CONCLUSION
Criminal prosecution of the Gulf oil spill became inevitable when BP
could not stop the flow of oil from the Macondo well and could not prevent
the resulting oil slick from reaching the shores of the Gulf of Mexico. Be-
cause of the notoriety of the case, the Gulf oil spill will be seen by many as
the paradigmatic environmental crime. Yet the case is better understood as
an outlier crime that raises difficult normative questions about how we cri-
minalize ordinary negligence under the Clean Water Act and about the role
of environmental harm in criminal prosecutions.
The government should criminally prosecute BP, Transocean, and Halli-
burton notwithstanding the issues that the case will raise. Criminal
prosecution will help deter future oil spills and will express societal outrage
about the spill in ways that civil penalties cannot. The enforcement response
to the Gulf oil spill needs to make clear that it is unacceptable for corpora-
tions to put profits before safety and the environment.
Criminal prosecution is not a substitute, however, for more vigilant regu-
lation of drilling activity and more robust enforcement of laws governing
drilling activities. The Gulf oil spill has demonstrated that we cannot rely on
oil companies and their contractors to safeguard sensitive ecosystems like
the Gulf of Mexico. Nor should we allow a criminal prosecution to distract
us from the larger question of our societal responsibility for the Deepwater
Horizon tragedy. BP, Transocean, and Halliburton-and other companies
who do business on the Gulf-conduct dangerous exploration activities be-
cause of the market demand that we provide. Until we cure our national
addiction to oil, we will continue to put the environment at risk with ever-
bolder efforts to drill miles beneath the ocean floor.
278. See Allen, supra note 251, at 3; Schulhofer, supra note 249, at 1510-11 ("[M]ost Ameri-
can jurisdictions exclude retaliation from the legitimate goals of the criminal law, and legal theorists
are virtually unanimous in applauding the judgment.").
279. As noted in Part H1, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act contains strict liability criminal provi-
sions. The Justice Department usually does not prosecute those crimes absent proof of negligence.
See supra note 148.
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